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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with finding a way to solve a surveillance system allocation problem
based on the need to consider intelligent insurgency that takes place in a complex geographical
environment. Although this effort can be generalized to other situations, it is particularly geared
towards protecting military outposts in foreign lands. The technological assets that are assumed
available include stare‐devices, such as tower‐cameras and aerostats, as well as manned and unmanned
aerial systems. Since acquiring these assets depends on the ability to control and monitor them on the
target terrain, their operations on the geo‐location of interest ought to be evaluated. Such an
assessment has to also consider the risks associated with the environmental advantages that are
accessible to a smart adversary. Failure to consider these aspects might render the forces vulnerable to
surprise attacks. The problem of this study is formulated as follows: given a complex terrain and a smart
adversary, what types of surveillance systems, and how many entities of each kind, does a military
outpost need to adequately monitor its surrounding environment? To answer this question, an analytical
framework is developed and structured as a series of problems that are solved in a comprehensive and
realistic fashion. This includes digitizing the terrain into a grid of cell objects, identifying high‐risk spots,
generating flight tours, and assigning the appropriate surveillance system to the right route or area.
Optimization tools are employed to empower the framework in enforcing constraints—such as
fuel/battery endurance, flying assets at adequate altitudes, and respecting the climbing/diving rate
limits of the aerial vehicles—and optimizing certain mission objectives—e.g. revisiting critical regions in
a timely manner, minimizing manning requirements, and maximizing sensor‐captured image quality. The
framework is embedded in a software application that supports a friendly user interface, which includes
the visualization of maps, tours, and related statistics. The final product is expected to support designing
surveillance plans for remote military outposts and making critical decisions in a more reliable manner.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction
When the U.S. armed forces deploy troops in foreign lands, they use Forwarding Operating
Bases (FOBs) as military settlements to support their operational, medical, logistical, and usual daily
needs (Miles, 2006; The Washington Times, 2008). FOBs represent the main stronghold (in a certain
region) where most of the soldiers, equipment, and ammunitions are present. They are usually well
protected against direct nearby attacks through fortified walls and obstacles, security patrols, and
sophisticated surveillance assets. The military also uses temporary bases, called outposts, in remote
regions to attain wider area protection. These outposts can be categorized as: (1) a Combat Operating
Post (COP), which lasts from weeks to months, and normally, has the size of a platoon (25‐60) or a
company (70‐250); or (2) an Observation Post (OP), which stays in theater for days and usually has a size
of a squadron (8‐15), sometimes a platoon.
However, once on foreign territory, the troops face the challenge of being unfamiliar with the
geographical settings of the theaters as well as the culture and intellect of the inhabitants. To be more
specific, outposts are sometimes located in disadvantageous regions where the terrain is rough, the
villagers sympathize with the insurgents, and the transportation network is distant. This renders
insurgent activities hard to predict, and sometimes, difficult to encounter. In fact, the U.S. Army has
indeed sustained damage from well‐orchestrated attacks on COP/OPs, such as the case of COPs Keiting
(McCullough, 2010) and Kahler (Ross, 2010). Although the minimal protection of the outpost may have
been a contributor to the failed defense, it is believed that the structure of the geographical location
and the fight against swift insurgents have also played a significant role (Dixon, 2009).
To prevent such incidents, the U.S. army is interested in investing in surveillance systems in
general (which, for the sake of this research effort, can be understood as platforms—either free‐flying or
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stationary—that are equipped with sensors), and in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in particular, to
provide adequate protection to outposts (UAS‐COE, 2010). First, airborne systems usually present an
attractive solution as they offer full‐motion video (FMV) long‐distance monitoring and wide area
covering without being noticed. Second, there is a subtle driver for using tactical UAVs as they are small
enough to be organic to the outposts, and hence, are able to mitigate the length of the Air Tasking Order
(ATO) cycle1, a process criticized for its inefficiency by Winkler (2006) and Downs (2007). The strategy of
long‐distance surveillance can give enough time to provide early warnings, and even timely backups,
upon the detection and identification of pre‐insurgency activities. This scheme is even more appealing in
hostile theaters where aerial technology is not available to the adversary.
The challenge of implementing this strategy is the existence of a number of constraining factors.
For instance, mountains and elevated lands restrict the flight of some unmanned aerial systems (UASs).
Also, harsh weather has the potential to decrease sensor visibility and cause flight disruption.
Furthermore, there is a tradeoff between covering a large area and providing good image quality for
detection and identification. Therefore, the selection from a wide variety of sensors and platforms, each
with a different set of limitation and capabilities, can become a cumbersome task for the person
responsible for designing the surveillance plan—the surveillance architect.

2. Motivation
This work is motivated by the importance and the degree of complexity of the target
surveillance planning problem as well as the inefficiency of the currently‐used methods to solve it. The
problem addressed in this study, although great in magnitude, is simple to understand: given a complex
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An ATO cycle is the process of allotting resources to a mission involving an air campaign.
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terrain and a smart adversary, what types of surveillance systems, and how many entities of each kind,
does an outpost need to adequately monitor its surrounding environment?
On the one hand, finding the best combinations of UASs and other systems (ground and manned
systems) to provide persistent surveillance to outposts is a critical task. This process however depends
on several external aspects such as understanding the geographical and meteorological aspects of the
theater, the potential routes to be taken by the insurgents, predicting enemy attack strategies, and
applying tactical expertise in the surveillance plan design. Failure to consider these points might render
the U.S. force vulnerable to surprise attacks.
On the other hand, the performance of an adequate study of a certain site requires multiple
skillful (and costly) personnel as well as a long period of time to achieve the objective. Sophisticated
simulation tools are typically used to integrate and investigate the behavior of insurgents, villagers, and
soldiers under different weather circumstances on impressively practical representations of the terrain.
Furthermore, both weapons and paths are incorporated as variables in the equation to render the
simulated model even more realistic. Because of its complexity, the model can require several months
to be developed, tested, and applied on different settings; not to forget that each simulation run usually
lasts for days. It is also very possible that many situations and plan attacks can be ignored due to time
and cost constraints. For more information on work and trends on simulation and artificial intelligence
(AI), see Sidran’s (2007) index.
Instead of using simulation, this research effort proposes the use of optimization and constraint
satisfaction tools, as mathematical and algorithmic methods are momentously faster. Moreover, those
can be integrated in a software program to automate a great part of the analysis, rendering the process
even quicker. This gives researchers and surveillance architects more time to test the reliability of the
surveillance portfolio by applying a wide range of attack vignettes through sensitivity analysis and similar
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techniques. Yet, unlike simulation, which is a direct mimicry of the real world (with a certain degree of
details), the use of mathematical and algorithmic methods require robust structuring of the problem.
Such a task can be complex as constraints and objective functions have to be formulated and linked in a
simplified and nonlinear fashion in order to achieve a practical runtime.
The contribution of this study is concerned with constructing an analytical framework to provide
an answer to the question established above, a question that presents a set of challenges that have yet
to be adequately addressed in the literature. In Chapter 2 Section 2.5, this contribution is elaborated
upon after a review of previous work in the relevant fields. Also, the result of this research is integrated
in a software decision‐support tool that permits the surveillance architect to build and evaluate
surveillance plans in an efficient manner. To achieve these goals, four high‐level steps are followed: (1)
acquiring the necessary knowledge and data to investigate and understand the quantitative aspects of
the problem; (2) framing the problem to establish the foundation for analytical modeling; (3)
constructing an analytical framework to solve the problem and analyze the solution given any set of data
inputs; and (4) developing a software program2 to provide an easy interface to the decision‐support
tool.

3. Problem Description
In this section, the implications that are generated as a result of trying to answer the research
question are discussed. The first direct implication is that there is a need to acquire technological assets
that are necessary to appropriately surveil the long‐distance surroundings of the outpost. Before
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Denidyzer (a detection and identification analyzer) is a Java software application designed to help
surveillance architects build and analyze surveillance portfolios. To download it or learn more about it,
visit http://comp.uark.edu/~nlehlou/denidyzer/ or contact the author at nlehlou@gmail.com.
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performing such an acquisition, it is wise to identify the right system to service the right region because
of the existence of technological and environmental constraints.
Firstly, from a technological point of view, there are limits on the capabilities of surveillance
systems. Sensors ought to be assigned to the proper platform as there are payload and compatibility
constraints. Additionally, each airborne vehicle has specific maximum and minimum altitudes that are
not to be crossed. It has explicit maximum climb‐ and dive‐rates (rates for the altitude increase and
decrease, respectively) that it cannot exceed. It has limits associated with crosswind resistance and
endurance, depending on its size and battery or fuel consumption. Also, when flying above a population,
the aerial device should be above a certain distance from the ground, called the dB‐distance (or decibel‐
distance), from which its noise can be heard, and hence reveal its presence.
Secondly, depending on the type of surveillance mission, an airborne device can be categorized
as a strategic or a tactical system. Strategic assets, also named Wide‐Area Surveillance (WAS) systems,
can fly at high altitudes and swipe wide areas with a wide field of view (FOV), but their image resolution
is usually low; this may restrict their use to WAS search and detection specifically. For identification,
which requires higher resolution, the platform’s operating altitude (OA) can be reduced, or the onboard
sensors may be zoomed on the target; these two options are not always possible though. Instead, these
systems can use cross‐cueing, which is the passing of information to another sensor. Such devices are
usually onboard a tactical asset that is dedicated to identification and classification missions. This is due
to the fact that tactical UAVs are small and able to fly at low altitudes, and thus can capture good quality
images. This segregation of strategic and tactical systems mitigates a certain degree of the
aforementioned tradeoff between the large‐swath wide‐FOV and the accurate narrow‐FOV. In this
study, the task of monitoring routes is assigned to tactical assets while their strategic counterparts are
assigned to service wide areas. Nevertheless, the aspect of event‐based cross‐cueing is considered out
of scope; instead, it is recommended to have an extra tactical system dedicated to this type of missions.
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Beside these free‐flying platforms, stationary systems—mainly camera‐towers and aerostats, which
provide persistent monitoring, are also considered along with the necessity of being anchored near the
outpost due to the need for their protection and safety.
Thirdly, the target terrain should be evaluated from the perspective of smart insurgents in order
to identify regions with high risks. Before doing so however, space has to first be modeled and
associated with parameters of interest such as altitudes, degree of foliage, and proximity to population.
Next, risk‐factors ought to be identified, assessed, and incorporated in the model formulation. Such
factors include spots around the outpost that have high altitudes and line‐of‐sight of the base; this
situation creates a potential for the presence of long‐range firearms. Also, trails and trafficable routes
provide a fast way for armed vehicles to approach the outpost. Identifying such risks helps know which
areas and routes should be monitored, and at which frequency (or revisit‐time). This further generates
the need for consideration of a forth aspect: given a set of high‐risk regions, what is the optimal flight
path that visits all the desired spots, provided the technological limits of each platform? This issue is
rendered even more complex with the incorporation of all the three spatial dimensions. This is an
important piece as the altitudes of the flight have to be known beforehand in order to achieve the
appropriate image resolution.
Finally, assigning uniquely identified assets to areas and routes is necessary and needs special
attention. This is important since the analysis of both the terrain and the technological systems only
reveals what type of asset is useful on the theater; it does not inform us about the required number of
each class. Thus, time has to be a factor in the equation in order to determine the number of identical
systems that can be utilized concurrently. The resource allocation should then be time‐based, and ought
to further reflect the fact that the manpower qualified to operate the platforms and monitor the
sensors’ output is very limited in outposts. In addition, the inconvenience caused by scheduling
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constraints has to also be considered; this includes the unavailability of non‐organic assets due to
refueling or maintenance.
In summary, the question of interest turns out to be a complex problem, and solving it by
integrating all aspects into one model is extremely challenging, if not impossible. Subsequently, the
procedure followed in this research effort is based on constructing an architectural framework that
segregates the main problem into realistically solvable sub‐problems. To be precise, the solution process
is divided into three phases: terrain evaluation, tour generation, and resource allocation. Additionally, a
fourth stage is added to the procedure in order to compute measures of interest for the surveillance
architect as this helps assess the potential performance of the surveillance plan.

7

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

1. Technologies
The military has always been interested in developing or purchasing technological systems that
would increase its deployment and missions’ success. A great part of these systems is focused around
the protection of the soldier, and they range from special suites to communication architectures in
theater, to surveillance assets. Of a particular interest to this study are surveillance systems, which can
be categorized under different groups, depending on their attributes and utilization.
A surveillance system can be decomposed into different components: (1) the platform, (2) the
mission package (which includes sensors), (3) the human element, (4) the control element, (5) the
display, (6) the communication architecture, and (7) the associated cycle logistics. For more information
on these aspects, see the report of the Army’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence (UAS‐
COE) (2010). In this study, focus is placed on the first and part of the second one, whereas the
availability of the rest in theater is assumed.
As far as the platform is concerned, it can be (1) stationary, such as towers, or (2) mobile, such
as fixed‐wings and rotary‐wings vehicles, or (3) both, such as lighter‐than‐air (LTA) platforms, which can
be either tethered or free‐flying. Below, each type is discussed in more details:


Towers and fix‐mounts, which can be inexpensive and easily deployed, can serve as the platform
for a stare‐ (or persistent surveillance) system. However, it can only hold small sensors, which
tend to have a shorter range for coverage. Another limitation is that it needs to be protected as
it cannot flee from threats and does not carry weapons; therefore, it has to be located close to
the base or outpost.
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Figure 1: A surveillance tower
Source: http://www.carnetdevol.org/actualite‐
ballon/aerostat/usArmy.html


Figure 2: An LTA Vehicle (airship)
Source: http://www.militaryaerospace.com/
articles/2011/05/tcom‐to‐provide‐five.html

LTA Platforms, as shown in Figure 2, are vehicles that use a light gas, such us helium, to stay
aloft. LTAs take different sizes, from balloons to airships, with each size having a specific
payload. In military, the typical name for stationary LTAs is aerostats, whereas its mobile
counterpart is called airships. Although they are more expensive than towers, LTAs can yield less
costly operations and maintenance (O&M) than winged vehicles, while still supporting heavy
lifts. Their relatively larger payload enables the use of more sophisticated sensors at higher
altitudes, thusly, covering large areas. Their drawback is vulnerability to firearms and long‐range
attacks as well as certain weather conditions. For more information about LTAs and their
military use, see Bolkcom (2004).



Winged platforms can be grouped under several overlapping categories. First, they can be either
rotary‐wings, such as helicopters, or fixed‐wings, such as commercial airplanes. Second, they
may be either manned or unmanned (UAV); and for the latter, they can be either remotely
controlled or autonomous. Finally, they can be categorized, depending on their use and
attributes, under the following classes (UAS‐COE, 2010):
o

Class 1: This type of airborne devices is small‐sized, highly portable, and easily launched by
hand. They fly at very low altitudes, carry small sensors (e.g. EO, IR, SAR), and provide
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accurate situational awareness. However, their endurance is very low (1‐3 hours). A good
example of this group is the RQ‐11 Raven, which can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The RQ‐11 Raven
Source: http://www.murdoconline.net/archives/date/2010/01/page/2
o

Class 2: This sort of aerial vehicles is medium‐sized, catapult‐launched, and relatively easy to
transport. They fly at low altitudes, carry small sensors, but enjoy a bit more power and
endurance than their counterpart from class 1. A good example of this group is the
ScanEagle, which is illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The ScanEagle
Source: http://www.milavia.net/news/archive.php?2006‐13
o

Class 3: This kind of airborne platforms is larger and heavier than the previous two, weighing
between 25kg and 600kg. They fly at medium altitudes with high speed and do not usually
require improved runways for launch. They can carry more sensors as well as small weapons
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and other devices (e.g. communication relays and moving target indicators). However, they
might sometimes experience a decrease in endurance (in comparison to class 2 vehicles)
due to the payload increase. Also, their transportation usually needs logistical support. A
good example of this group is the RQ‐7 Shadow, which is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: The RQ‐7 Shadow
Source: http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=326

Figure 6: The MQ‐1 Predator
Source: http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav_13.html
o

Class 4: This type of aerial devices enjoys more power and payload capacity than their
aforementioned counterparts without compromising endurance. They are also able to fly at
medium and high altitudes and carry a variety of assets including weapons and automated
identification systems. They do however require improved runways for launch and recovery,
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and they usually have a large logistical footprint. A good example of this group is the MQ‐1
Predator, which can be seen in Figure 6.
o

Class 5: These aircrafts are the largest available platforms. They fly at medium and high
altitudes with the greatest airspeed, range, and endurance. They carry a wide variety of
devices, ranging from wide‐area sensors and radars to supplies and heavy weapons. They
can cover very large areas, but their resolution and identification accuracy are usually low.
Other drawbacks of their use include their significant logistical footprint as well as their
requirement of improved areas of launch and recovery. A good example of this group is the
Constant Hawk, which is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: The Constant Hawk
Source: http://defense‐update.com/features/2009/sept/1709009_awapss.html

A sample of the platforms and their associated data, including the minimum and maximum
operating altitudes (minOA & maxOA) can be found in Table 1 and Table 2:

Platform
Tower
Aerostat
Raven
ScanEagle
Shadow
Grey Eagle
Constant Hawk

Table 1: Platforms and their associated motion‐based attributes
Communication
MaxOA
MinOA
Cruise Velocity Downtime
(s)
Range (m)
(ASL) (m) (AGL) (m)
(m/s)
n/a
20000
30
0
0
n/a
4570
457
0
0
10000
4250
9
18
300
100000
5950
60
25
900
50000
4500
152
40
3600
n/a
7620
1524
46
10800
n/a
6090
2438
90
10800
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dB‐Distance
(AGL) (m)
n/a
n/a
152
152
213
609
1524

Table 2: Platforms and their associated attributes that are not motion‐based
Operators
Payload
Endurance
Wind Resistance
Alpha Angle
Platform
Count
(kg)
(h)
(m/s)
(deg)
Tower
0
4.53
n/a
25
~0
Aerostat
1
90.71
n/a
20
90
Raven
1
0.18
1.5
8
45
ScanEagle
1
4.53
24
16
45
Shadow
2
45.35
7
11
45
Grey Eagle
3
362.87
30
20
45
Constant Hawk
4
680.38
7
20
45
From the other end of the spectrum, sensors represent the other aspect of aerial systems that is
of special interest. These devices differ from each other through a set of capabilities and parameters,
some of which can be found in Table 3:
Table 3: Sensors and their associated attributes
Weight
Slant‐Range to Detect Vehicle
Sensor
(kg)
(from Ground Level) (m)
Raven IR
0.1814
640
micro‐12
3.4019
10800
MX‐12
18.1437
17600
MX‐15
54.431
18400
AWAPSS‐IR
317.5147
6000
Other sensors that can be employed include SAR, GMTI, SIGINT, and radars, all of which can be modeled
as a set of parameters. Note that SIGINT (signals intelligent) platforms can also provide monitored radio
and telephone communications.

2. Literature Review
In this section, some of the related topics that have been addressed in the literature are
discussed. Such topics are grouped under four major categories: (1) the importance of understanding
and modeling the terrain for good situational awareness, (2) the dynamic nature of interacting with an
adaptive and smart adversary, (3) the issues pertaining to employing UAVs when planning and executing
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missions, and (4) the different modeling techniques used by researchers to provide solutions for paths
generation and resource allocation.

2.1. Space Representation and Assessment
Military targeting in general, and military surveillance in particular, are greatly dependent on the
theater’s geographical environment. Therefore, the spatial structure ought to be well modeled and
analyzed. In fact, such a study becomes even more important when terrain is complex and mountainous
as visibility and aircraft flight can greatly be affected. We define complex terrain as any geographical
location that causes complexity or hindrance in terms of operations or field of view, such as sloppy
regions and harsh weather (e.g. wind and dust). In this section, the methodologies used in the literature
for space representation are listed, and some of the work performed on terrain assessment is
mentioned.
As far as space representation is concerned, whether it is modeling sea, terrain, routes, or flight
paths, there are four main techniques:


The first one is based on a set of nodes or waypoints that are distributed across the target
region. Although simplistic, this way of representing terrain is used by several studies such as
Secrest (2001), Sheu et al. (2005), Kilby et al. (2007), and Balcik et al. (2008). In fact, in cases
where the surface of the earth is flat (e.g. sea) or has a known infrastructure (e.g. roads), it
makes perfect sense to represent space as a set of points of interest. For instance, Kilby et al.
(2007) employs this strategy in structuring the problem in order to plan maritime surveillance
for the Australian nautical areas.



The second technique utilizes continuous representation of space, which requires the use of
calculus and differential methods as well as curvatures and nonlinear measures. Studies that
favor this strategy include Novy (2001), Zabarankin et al. (2002), and Ahmadzadeh et al. (2008).
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The issue with this methodology is that it can be a challenge when modeling, and whose
complexity increases even further when constraints are added (Royset et al., 2009). For
instance, Ahmadzadeh et al. (2008) uses continuous representation, but soon reaches the point
where the model has to be discretized before being solved.


The third technique is based on the use of Triangulated Irregular Networks (TINs) (see Peucker
et al., 1980), which is a type of data structures most commonly used in geographic information
systems (GIS). For illustration, Figure 8 depicts an example of a region that is modeled through a
TIN. The advantage of such technique is that along the capability of well representing 3D
surfaces, it can yield “adaptive resolution, support hierarchical methods, [and] have generally
lower storage requirements” (Fok, 2005, p. 2). Its disadvantages include its difficulty to
implement as part of a solution, let alone the case where the appropriate (highly detailed) data
is hard or impossible to obtain.

Figure 8: A region modeled through a TIN
Source: http://www.stanfords.co.uk/business‐mapping/lidar/


The last technique is based on a discrete representation of space; it is also called a grid, a grid‐
mesh, or Regular Square Grid (RSG), and seems to be the most popular as it is used by many
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studies (Grignon et al., 2002; Kim & Hespanha, 2003; Fok, 2005; Royset et al., 2009) and
implemented in coverage analysis commercial software such as AGI’s STK3 (see an application
example in Carrico and Downer, n.d.). The grid digitization promotes simplicity and flexibility in
modeling and developing algorithmic solvers, but can require high memory storage; this concern
is however decreasingly considered as computational power continuously increases (Fok, 2005).

Figure 9: Dividing the 3D space into a voxel‐grid
Source: Sikranth et al. (2008)
RSG also leads to the tradeoff between accuracy and computational complexity; as an example,
for the average slope of a certain grid cell to be accurate, the mesh has to be granular enough,
which might cause computational expensiveness. Last, a benefit of this technique is that once
the grid is established, a network model can be generated (as performed by Royset (2009), by
having every two adjacent cells represented by two nodes connected by an arc), which leads the
end result to resemble the firstly‐presented representation (a network of waypoints), but with a
much greater difference in scale and structure.

3

STK, or Systems Tool Kit, is a software package that allows the user to model, analyze, and visualize
space, defense, and intelligence systems. STK is developed by AGI. Source: http://www.agi.com/
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On the other hand, when talking about analyzing space and evaluating terrain, a number of
assessment techniques can be mentioned. One reason for the existence of several methods, whether
developed for military, government, or civil purposes, is that the aim and the type of the study as well as
its associated factors need customized analyses. Waser et al. (2011) for instance uses raw data obtained
through visual sensors to classify tree species. Caplan and Kennedy (2010) utilizes a multi‐layered matrix
framework on crime data to predict future crimes in city neighborhoods in order to assist the police
force allocate its limited resources more efficiently. Sikranth et al. (2010) employs 3D rendering of
simulated terrain, along with a haptic interface to capture environmental constraints, in order to find
aircraft paths that provide optimal visibility. Howard and Seraji (2002) uses real‐time terrain assessment
combined with fuzzy navigation algorithms to help autonomous mobile robots choose the safest and
most trafficable path on the ground. Last, Fok (2005) discusses the design of a performance assessment
architecture that uses a multi‐phased analytical approach to evaluate how well a planned path performs
in a complex terrain. His model receives ground coordinates and flight tours as inputs and presents
visibility attributes and coverage quality as outputs, along with some other relevant statistics. In
summary, the methodology followed to evaluate planetary surfaces and their surroundings depend on
the needs and attributes involved in the study.

2.2. Counter‐Insurgency
Terrain assessment becomes of a great value when the planetary surface is complex, especially
when intelligent insurgents take advantage of this complexity. Places with high slopes and elevations
might present a more attractive option for cover. Staying in villages and merging with civilians may pose
a good opportunity to temporarily stay safe and acquire supplies. Furthermore, as a counter‐measure
against aerial surveillance, insurgents might choose to settle in regions with extensive foliage or where
wind prevents flight of tactical UAVs. The intelligent adversary may then be able to use the
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environmental aspects of the geographical locations that are familiar to them to hide and launch
attacks. It is therefore important to obtain enough intelligence about the surrounding geo‐locations.
On the other hand, situational awareness is acquired through Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) means, which are critical to mission planning and execution (Downs, 2007). Downs
also adds that the missions’ probability of success can be enhanced by augmenting the availability of ISR
assets and using them efficiently. Indeed, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) can potentially be located,
and infiltration routes and ambush locations can be identified and monitored. However, the study
asserts that the current net effect of the ISR missions is far less than optimal despite the high ISR hours
flown, and that is due to the lack of appropriateness of positioning airborne elements for counter‐
insurgency (COIN) operations. This is further complicated by the fact that freedom missions (such as in
Iraq and Afghanistan) are meant to protect rather than attack, while the adversary is small, hidden,
dynamic, and unpredictable. In fact, Turbiville (2009) studies and compiles a list of cases and approaches
adopted by guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists from several parts of the world. The author
demonstrates the importance of intelligence in these groups’ operations, a fact that emphasizes that the
adversary is indeed smart, and that nonconventional military methods should be explored. Using this
mindset, Kaplan et al. (2010) considers counter‐insurgency against smart enemy from a game theorist
and force allocation standpoints. The study develops an optimization decision tool that takes into
consideration different levels of government intelligence as well as casualties caused by attacks on
terrorist cells. Nevertheless, this work is different than ours as the authors focus on engagement rather
than surveillance, while they do not consider terrain complexity.
When exploiting airborne surveillance for COIN, four main tasks are usually performed against
the enemy, as specified by Chandler et al. (2002): (1) search (or surveillance), (2) classification (or
identification), (3) attack (or engagement), and (4) verification. Surveillance targets monitoring areas of
interests and finding suspicious behavior or a change of local activities. Once a detection of an unusual
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object occurs, the need for more intelligence is necessary; as a result, a reconnaissance mission is
launched in order to identify the detected entity. If it is classified as a threat, then necessary actions are
taken. Typically, these actions have consisted of engaging in attacks to eliminate the menace; however,
counter‐actions can also include fortifying the defense and waiting for the adversary to arrive, or calling
for a rapid aerial backup. Once the attacker is destroyed, it might be required to order a verification
mission so as to insure that the threat is not going to be persistent in the future. That been explained, it
is worth noting that this study is centered around the first two tasks as its goal is to support a defensive
model rather than an offensive one, especially that OPs and COPs have a temporary presence and
limited human resources.

2.3. UAV Employment and Mission Planning
With the recent robotic evolution in the last decades, the military has developed a special rising
interest towards UAVs (Mettler, 2003; Bayraktar, 2005). These airborne devices have several advantages
over their manned counterparts such as being quiet, less expensive, easier to fly in low altitudes and
around corners, and probably and most importantly, capable of reducing risk and workload on soldiers
(UAS‐COA, 2010). As a result, recent research and development efforts have aimed to render UAVs more
employable in both theaters and civilian settlements through addressing constraints and control issues,
advancing mission planning and aviation techniques, and improving computational performance.
Research has strived to ameliorate the UAV motion manipulation and the generation of flight
paths. As a matter of fact, aerial vehicles’ maneuverability limits have proved to be a challenge in real‐
time avionic control (Ahmadzadeh, 2008), a genuine motive behind the several explorations in
autonomy and flight‐routing during this past decade. Frazzoli et al. (1999) for example presents a
framework that yields efficient real‐time trajectory generation for an autonomous helicopter; the
developed hierarchical architecture yields considerable reduction in computational requirements due to
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the simplified system design. Choset (2001) explores the coverage path planning approach for mobile
robots by surveying research studies as well as comparing their contributed algorithms and categorizing
them into four major types; the author concludes that there are advantages and disadvantage to each
kind in terms of coverage optimality, obstacle detection, computational complexity, and others. Mettler
et al. (2003) develops test scenarios to expose and evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the
constructed instantaneous route planner and the maneuverability of the subject autonomous UAV.
Bayraktar et al. (2004) conducts UAV flight experiments both at the University of Pennsylvania testbed
and using simulation in order to validate a real‐time algorithmic model that accounts for both physical
dynamics and mode‐switching logic; the study reports positive results and concludes that the founded
framework can serve as modeling abstraction for future UAV cooperative control.
Other researchers target path generation less at the control and aviation level, and more at the
pre‐flight decision making level; their studies are mainly concerned with mission planning and optimized
vehicle routing, either specifically for UAVs, or generally for any free‐flying platform. For instance,
Srikanth et al. (2008) introduces a built simulation‐based optimization system that exploits a haptic
interface to refine the flight path in a triple‐dimensional space; the mechanism allows the assessment of
both the vision and visibility of the airborne asset in order to promote informed decisions during
organizing a mission. On the other hand, Seacrest (2001) aims to reduce the complexity of the mission
route planning (MRP) problem and its solution runtime though a heuristic approach; the author’s focus
revolves around fine‐tuning and experimenting with different algorithm configurations to achieve near‐
optimality in the shortest possible time. Kim and Hespanha (2003) introduces a procedure to efficiently
generate shortest paths in effort to minimize the UAV’s risk and time over defended enemy grounds;
the approach reduces the problem at hand by shifting from continuous representation to a discrete one,
which results in better computation times without compromising the quality of the solution. Similarly,
Royset et al. (2009) explores a constraint‐based optimization model for shortest flight trajectories that
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accounts for land threats such as surface‐to‐air missiles (SAMs) stations; it also provides great flexibility
of analysis with regards to important tactical aspects like terrain avoidance, terrain‐masking of enemy
radar, varying aircraft speeds, as well as several kinds of aircrafts. The authors apply the presented tool
to different synthetic military missions, one of which is specific to the unmanned Northrop Grumman
Hunter (MQ‐5B).
To help provide flight solutions that are more practical, some researchers opt to address
constraints and limitations that are faced in the physical world. For example, a common potential
hindrance in UAV flights is the impact of wind on airborne operations, an issue taken into consideration
by several studies such as Mettler et al. (2003), Bayraktar et al. (2005), and Ahmadzadeh et al. (2008).
Further, Ahmadzadeh et al. (2008) incorporates in the developed model the vehicles’ maneuverability
limits as well as the fixed positions of the camera sensors. From another perspective, Kilby et al. (2007)
and Royset et al. (2009) model two predominant restraining factors: mission deadlines and fuel
capacities. The latter study even considers more flight constraints by integrating the aircrafts’ operating
altitudes as well as the diving and climbing rates in the constructed Mixed Integer Program (MIP) model.
Another practical study in this context is Srikanth et al. (2008), which applies kinematic and
environmental constraints through forces exerted on a haptic interface, and allows the user to specify
restrictions on curvatures and total length of curves.
A common issue observed through the reviewed work is dealing with the tradeoff between
flexibility and optimality during the flight mission planning process. To explain, there are usually two
kinds of utilized methods: online and offline. Online (or real‐time) programs are executed during a
vehicle’s flight and are usually used as part of the control operation of robots, autopilots, or
autonomous UAVs (Frazzoli et al., 1999; Howard & Seraji, 2002; Mettler, 2003; Bayraktar, 2005; Kilby et
al., 2007); but they can also be utilized during a last‐minute planning of an ongoing mission (Fok, 2005).
To illustrate the utility of online algorithms, consider Kilby et al. (2007), a study that considers real‐time
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path planning computation to monitor the Australian nautical areas; the involved airborne vehicle has a
pre‐defined set of waypoints to visit, but without previous knowledge about the location of future ship
encounter. If a (moving) maritime vessel is detected, the aircraft has to find the best way to get close
enough to it, classify it, and then continue the surveillance mission. The corresponding online program is
executed dynamically once every one minute to update the flight tour. While such a method provides
great flexibility that yields a way to adjust for last‐minute occurrences and unpredictable events, it falls
short in solving large‐scale problems or carrying out computationally expensive processes since there is
a very tight limit on the solution runtime or processing power. To mitigate this limitation, the
computation associated with flight planning and mission targeting can alternatively be performed offline
(i.e. prior to the trip), but the flexibility aspect would be lost. On the other hand, offline techniques are
ideal for some pre‐flight mission planning tasks such as resource allocation, and even route generation,
given a certain degree of certitude. For instance, Chandler et al. (2002) helps make cooperative
decisions about vehicle assignments to teams during the offline mission planning process, whereas
Royset et al. (2009) targets pre‐flight route generation provided that the locations of ground threats are
known beforehand. Note that there are also doubly‐phased models that use both kinds of algorithms—
online and offline—in an interoperable fashion. A good example is the analytical tool presented by Fok
(2005), which first performs offline computations to analyze the terrain and generate horizon surfaces;
then the online evaluation is triggered upon request during the assessment phase. Such paradigm helps
the planning operations during the second stage be executed much faster.
Note that unlike the studies that assume the presence of artificial intelligence and cooperative
control, the models developed in this research are kept general, and the availability of autonomous
UAVs is not particularly assumed. This is an important point as this effort serves the near‐term decision
making on resource allocation, a task that requires careful consideration of manning requirements,
especially with respect to the scarce qualified personnel that are able to control the UAVs.
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2.4. Modeling and Algorithms
To model research problems, the relevant studies use diverse abstract structures and objective
functions depending on the addressed issues, which span cooperative control, threat avoidance,
surveillance coverage, resource allocation, and others. For example, Carrico and Downer (n.d.) targets a
flight plan that maximizes coverage and minimizes revisit‐times for a commercial aircraft utilized for the
surveillance of coastal waters; the modeling aspect is handled by the employed software package—STK.
Ahmadzadeh et al. (2008) pursues the same coverage objective for a set of cooperative unmanned aerial
vehicles, but the approach is based on a combination of calculus and Integer Programming (IP) , whose
model is dependent on the discretization of time, space, and curvature. Secrest (2001) on the other
hand solves the MRP problem as a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with an objective of minimizing the
distance traveled, since shorter tours lead to reduced travel time, fuel consumption, and potential risk.
Conversely, Novy (2001) considers generating UAV paths that have minimal exposure to the enemy’s
radar by relying on calculus of variation and sensitivity analysis. In a similar effort, Jun and D’Andrea
(2003) assumes a Shortest Path Problem (SPP) structure and uses the Bellman‐Ford algorithm to plan
safe UAV routes on a digitized 2D terrain. Further, Royset et al. (2009) uses a constrained‐SPP structure
modeled as a Mathematical Programming (MP) formulation to find the path that gives the highest
probability of mission success given that there are ground threats on the theater; the mission consists of
having the aerial vehicle reach the destination where the identification or engagement mission is to be
accomplished, and then return to the base unharmed. As for resource allocation approaches in military
context, consider Chandler et al. (2002), a study that uses a hybrid method that is based on graph theory
and a variant of the Linear Assignment Problem (LAP) to allocate teams and UAVs to military tasks; the
objective is to complete the mission in the least amount of time. Alternatively, Kaplan et al. (2010)
applies a Knapsack approximation to allot forces to the yet‐to‐be‐decided attack plans with a min‐
objective function that reflects the damage inflicted on civilians and allied soldiers. Dong et al. (2010)
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adopts a Maximal Covering Problem (MCP) structure in an effort to allocate protective resources to a set
of threatened intermediary facilities in a military distribution network, with the aim to achieve the least
instability after the attack; the objective function is modeled as a sum of demand points. Gomez et al.
(2008) constructs an ontology‐based architecture that exploits a Set Covering Problem (SCP) model to
assign sensors and platforms to the appropriate tasks for ISR missions. All in all, a significant portion of
the reviewed mission planning efforts uses optimization in order to achieve effective solutions or
efficient performance through different modeling schemes. Such research can also be categorized in a
general manner under two groups: (1) routing or path planning problems, whether it is TSP‐based or
SPP‐based, and (2) resource allocation problems. Yet, it is possible to find work in Operations Research
(OR) that stems from both categories. Specifically, we highlight Balcik et al. (2008), a study that employs
a multi‐phased mathematical model that incorporates routing and resource allocation, along with
scheduling, to come up with a complete plan during the Last Mile Distribution of disaster relief efforts. It
is true that their methodology assumes the existence of a transportation infrastructure and does not
account for terrain attributes; however, their model does inspire us in designing the aforementioned
architectural framework as well as considering routing and resource allocation in the same solution.
A relevant remark about modeling that is worth mentioning is related to the way flight paths are
represented. To elaborate, it seems that fewer research studies address the challenging 3D aspect of
route planning. Amongst the reviewed work, the following are highlighted: Fok (2005) uses altitudes and
horizon lines to generate a triple‐dimensional grid‐mesh of the terrain. Sikranth et al. (2008) employs
3D‐rendering of the planetary surface in their software visualization before the generation of vision and
visibility field of the flown vehicle. Carrico and Downer (n.d.) utilizes the STK commercial simulation
software to build a 3D CAD model so as to evaluate area coverage and revisit‐times by a Boeing 737 that
is equipped with the radar AN/APY‐10. Last but not least, Royset et al. (2009) divides the space into a
voxel (cubical) grid before converting into a network of flight edges; this eventually leads the problem
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and storage requirement to grow exponentially, but the use of a network reduction technique helps
mitigate this effect.
Note that studies pertaining to route generation and mission planning can generally be
segregated into two collections in terms of the underlying algorithmic models of their approach. There
are ones that assume a well‐established system infrastructure such as a well‐known heuristic or
mathematical program, and whose authors gravitate towards improving the performance and efficiency
of the mechanism. The second group on the other hand tends to focus more on the modeling aspect by
constructing a novel problem structure and assessing its effectiveness at supplying practical solutions.
The research effort of this study may be categorized under the second collection.

2.5. Conclusion and Contribution
The literature review shows that surveillance planning and counter‐insurgency have indeed
received some attention; nonetheless, the reviewed work is not directly applicable to the target
problem of this study. For terrain assessment, all the so‐far found methods and analyses are specific to
their subject problem and have therefore limited functionality. In addition, there is a lack of integrated
optimization models that take the terrain analysis as an input and produce resource allocation and
routing solutions. It is also noticed that research in the optimization theory literature in general, and in
military surveillance in particular, enjoys a wide variety of methodologies for solving problems.
However, there is still a need for modeling some of the realistic aspects that the surveillance architect
looks for during the planning phase. Some of these aspects happen to be a great challenge to model or
integrate in an already complex framework.
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, there is a lack in the literature of work that
solves the presented problem from beginning to end; meaning that terrain evaluation, routing, resource
allocation, and scheduling are important aspects that rarely occur and get resolved within the same
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solution process. This effort on the other hand offers a comprehensive analytical tool that takes all the
aforementioned points into consideration. Moreover, the constructed solution further associates smart
insurgents operations with planetary surface complexity to assess terrain. Last but not least, this study
introduces optimization models that incorporate newly defined constraints to achieve more realism and
practicality. From a military standpoint, the surveillance architect is empowered with a powerful
software solution that is also user‐friendly, which brings about the efficient generation of surveillance
plans and portfolios. Ultimately, the software user enters three sets of data that are relatively available:
terrain data, sensors capabilities, and platform attributes. Then, the analytical engine generates the list
of sensors and platforms to be purchased as an output, along with the routes and areas that each
system is to service, the flight schedules of airborne vehicles, and relevant statistics that reflect the
quality of the achieved plan.

26

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

1. Concept
In this context, a surveillance portfolio represents a set of technological systems assigned to
different geographical points of interest to provide adequate protection to a specific region. Moreover,
a system here refers to a combination of sensors (such as radars and cameras) carried or mounted on a
certain platform (an aerial vehicle, an aerostat, or a tower). Further, we define the surveillance plan to
be a layout (for static assets) and a set of scheduled tours (for mobile assets) that are covered by
employing the resources of a specific portfolio. This concept of plans and portfolios is used to provide
the surveillance architect with a way to allocate technological assets to multiple geographical regions
and assess the quality of such allocation. A portfolio contains a number of three‐way assignments, which
include a list of sensors, one platform, and a set of regions that are to be serviced by these surveillance
systems; this is illustrated in Figure 10.

Figure 10: The three‐way assignment model in a surveillance portfolio scheme
To model these regions in particular, and the spatial aspect in general, the terrain map is
digitized into a two‐dimensional grid, where the meaning of a grid cell is expanded from the notion of a
small squared portion of the big picture to an abstract structural object. To elaborate, each cell shall act
as an origin and destination node (for mobile assets), which provides a foundation for the construction
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of edges and networks. A cell also serves as a container for data values pertaining to the characteristics
of its geo‐location, which span the following attributes, as well as the yet‐to‐be introduced risk‐factor
scores and their associated revisit‐times:


ej is the average altitude (or elevation) of cell j’s geo‐surface



emj is the minimum altitude (or elevation) of cell j’s geo‐surface



eMj is the maximum altitude (or elevation) of cell j’s geo‐surface



βj is the average slope angle of cell j’s ridges and elevations



pj is the size of the population inhabiting the area of cell j



tj is the average trafficability level of cell j



fj is the average foliage level of cell j



vj is the average wind speed on the area of cell j



oj is 1 is cell j belongs to the target outpost, and 0 otherwise



laj is 1 if cell j constitutes a good location for an aerostat anchor‐point, and 0 otherwise



ltj is 1 if cell j constitutes a good location for a camera‐tower installation, and 0 otherwise

Note that for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that all these terrain attributes hold the same value
across every point within the area of their comprising cell. Further, it is possible to adopt any cell size
when adopting the presented methodology; however, the smaller this size is, the more accurate the
procedure and the outcome are.
When constructing a surveillance portfolio, the challenge of establishing assignments of assets
to geo‐spots or terrain cells is the presence of a number of constraints that prevents systems from
operating in specific regions. One advantage of using a constraint analysis framework in such a process
is that the infeasible options are automatically omitted. This feature is even more valuable in cases

28

where most or all of the assignments are impossible as the task of building and checking all possible
combinations is rendered unnecessary.
The constraints that are taken in consideration in this analysis are the following:
1. The compatibility constraint, which is verified when the selected sensor is installable on and
compatible with the selected platform.
2. The payload constraint, which is violated if the sum of the weights of the selected sensors
exceed the payload capacity of the selected platform.
3. The sensing distance constraint, which is verified when the system can be at an altitude from
which it can sense at least a vehicle on the ground, with some tolerance on the altitude
threshold (a 10% tolerance is used as a default value).
4. The operating altitude constraint, which is verified if the platform flies at a height that is
between its minimum and maximum possible operating altitudes (specified by the
manufacturer).
5. The terrain elevation constraint, which is verified if the platform can be at an altitude that is
higher than the average altitude of the terrain, with some tolerance on the altitude threshold (a
10% tolerance is used as a default value).
6. The stealth or noise (dB) distance constraint, which is verified if the platform can be at an
altitude from which targets on the ground cannot hear its noise.
7. The wind level constraint, which is violated if a system is assigned to a region where the wind
level is higher than the platform’s resistance.
8. The control range constraint, which is violated if the airborne vehicle is scheduled for a tour
that leads it to leave its control range radius.
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9. The diving rate constraint, which is verified if the difference in the operating altitude of a flying
system from one cell to another adjacent cell does not exceed the maximum platform’s diving
rate. Note that diving does have a different consumption rate of battery.
10. The climbing rate constraint, which is verified if the difference in the operating altitude of a
flying system from one cell to another adjacent cell does not exceed the maximum platform’s
climbing rate. Note that climbing does have a different consumption rate of battery.
11. The endurance constraint, which is violated if the route or area to be covered by the assigned
system requires a time frame that is larger than the period allowed by the battery or fuel limit of
the platform.
12. The refueling need constraint, which is violated if a platform is not provided with enough time
to refuel or charge its battery before its next flight.
13. The revisit‐time constraint, which is verified if the revisit‐frequency required to regularly
monitor a certain area or route is met.
14. The asset protection constraint, which is verified if the stationary platforms are within the range
of the base’s protection.
15. The minimum resolution constraint, which is violated if the minimum required image quality at
a certain region or sub‐route is not met.
16. The scheduling constraint, which is violated if a platform is flown during its non‐designated time
periods or during its unavailability due to maintenance.

2. Analytical Framework
This study aims at developing an analytical framework that can help the surveillance architect or
the decision maker answer the investment question stated in Chapter 1. To achieve this goal, the
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concept discussed in the previous section, along with the set of defined constraints, is leveraged to
construct a structure for the developed tool in order to solve the problem of interest in a feasible and
efficient fashion. In this section, a high‐level architecture of the framework is introduced, and the
analytical processes associated with each of its sub‐levels are summarized.
Firstly, the high‐level architecture of the proposed analytical framework is divided into four
components that perform the computations of four sequential phases: (1) terrain risk assessment, (2)
tour generation, (3) system allocation, and (4) surveillance plan evaluation (as depicted in Figure 11).
The framework receives data about platforms, sensors, and terrain as input. In return, it presents as an
output a solution to the research question, along with some performance measures about the proposed
surveillance plan. This output also includes data that shall serve as a foundation for visualizing results
through software tools such as Microsoft‐Excel or custom programs.

Figure 11: The high‐level architecture of the analytical framework
The first phase of the analysis is concerned with assessing the risk of each grid cell in the
aforementioned digitized terrain. This is achieved by employing a technique called Risk Terrain Modeling
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(RTM) on the terrain data that is extracted from the framework’s input. This evaluation method enables
the approximation of the importance of each cell as well as the need and frequency to monitor it. Cells
that are found to be of high potential importance to insurgents are referred to as hotspots. The criteria
that this study is considering to identify these geo‐spots span:


Grounds that are of higher altitudes than the outpost



High degrees of foliage



Proximity to the villages and their population size



Areas with low slopes



Terrain with a high level of trafficability



Places from which line‐of‐sight of the outpost is not obstructed



Locations of interests from the eye of an expert in the field
The second phase receives the collection of identified hotspots as input and generates for each

tactical system a tour that potentially visits every one of these cells in an efficient manner. This is
accomplished by solving the Traveling Salesman Problem, whose output is a near‐optimal sequence of
hotspot visits. Next, the TSP tour is refined through a set of optimization models and algorithmic
methods so as to acquire the complete cell‐to‐cell routes on the digitization grid. This process includes
finding the appropriate operating altitude at which the UAV should fly so its sensor can capture good‐
resolution images. This is particularly important because the purpose of sending out surveillance assets
is to obtain clear information and intelligence that allow the outpost personnel to acquire accurate
situational awareness. Some of the flight specifications are determined using the framework’s input
information, spanning terrain, sensors, and platforms data. The flight restraints that are considered in
this tour generation phase are related to the following constraints: the compatibility between the
platform and its assigned sensor, the payload capacity of the platform, the sensing distance, the
operating altitude, the dB‐distance, the wind level, the diving and climbing rates, and the platform’s
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endurance. Planning routes without considering these not only jeopardizes the success of the mission,
but might lead to the loss of the surveillance asset as well. Note that the refined tours are not
guaranteed to be entirely traversable due to the endurance limit of the aerial vehicle; if so, the
trajectory is segmented into feasibly crossable subtours, only the most efficient of which are selected in
the next stage.
During the third phase, surveillance systems are to be assigned to service given routes and
areas. Accordingly, optimization models and heuristics are developed with a built‐in consideration of
allocating the proper assets to the right regions and trails. In other words, the analytical framework
takes into account the fact that aerial vehicles can appropriately monitor high‐risk routes and regions far
away from the outposts, whereas the stare‐systems are suitable for the persistent surveillance of the
nearby surroundings of the outpost. By exploiting the terrain and systems data along with the tours and
subtours generated in the previous phase, the resource allocation process for mobile assets is
performed in a time‐based manner in order to realistically scale the flights schedule for the whole 24‐
hour period. This is performed using a variant of the Set Covering Problem that takes the apt constraints
into consideration and minimizes the number of required resources to purchase. As for the stationary
assets, a layout heuristic is executed to efficiently position sensors so as to decrease unnecessary
redundancy in FOV coverage and provide a lean solution. The models and algorithms are also concerned
with satisfying the constraints associated with the previously introduced factors: the need to refuel the
free‐flying vehicles, the appropriate revisit‐frequency, and the necessity of asset protection. Moreover,
scheduling restrictions are considered by accounting for aspects that cause predictable temporal
inconvenience during flight operations—mainly downtime during refueling and maintenance. In
summary, time‐based and space‐based optimization is applied in this stage of the analysis to provide a
realistic resource allocation solution with the minimum required assets to be deployed, and that
completes the construction process of the surveillance plan.
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Finally, the last phase uses a set of identified performance measures to reflect the feasibility of
the attained portfolio of systems and the robustness of its associated surveillance plan. This is discussed
with more details in the next section of this chapter.

3. Performance Measures
The surveillance plan is as important as the lives it protects; therefore, it is compulsory to have a
way to evaluate it and measure its quality. This becomes even more essential when the solution
obtained through optimization does not tell the whole story. In other words, after producing the best
possible plan, it is critical to know where the weaknesses are. These include the regions and spots that:
(1) cannot be reached, (2) can be reached less frequently than necessary, or (3) can be reached in a
timely manner but with low image resolution. It is also necessary to know how much slope coverage can
be achieved as a UAV may pass right by an insurgent situated on a high slope and not capture him
visually. Although the developed optimization models cannot address this issue, this can serve as a
warning to the operators so that they tilt the UAV’s sensor with an angle that is large enough, or even
make several rounds around a hill or a mountain to increase the chances of detection success. In such
cases, close attention has to be paid to fuel/battery limits—and one way to mitigate this problem is to
plan flights with energy reserves. Another important point is the rate of utilization of flown assets
because maintenance is as important as operation. These explained situations introduce the need to
extract useful statistics for the surveillance architect after the acquisition of the optimized surveillance
plan.
After a plan and its associated portfolio are constructed, the surveillance architect can analyze
its performance by evaluating four identified measures:
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1. The required manning, which is the amount of human resources necessary to operate the
systems that are included in the portfolio. This measure is computed by summing up the
number of needed personnel to control, manage, and maintain both platforms and sensors.
2. The surface coverage, which is the overall area around the outpost that is constantly monitored
through the set of installed stationary systems. Such a measure is computed using a heuristic
that minimizes the overlap between the intersecting sensors’ FOV. The computation process is
described in details in Chapter 6 Section 2.
3. The overall image quality, which is modeled by the average sensor resolution provided by all
the surveillance systems that are included in the portfolio:
R = Average{i in Sensors, j in Regions} (Rij) = Average((1000 si/ri) . cos(θij) . (1 ‐ fj/3))
Where: ‐ Rij is the image resolution of sensor i in region j
‐ si is the sensitivity (power) of sensor i
‐ ri is the slant‐range of sensor i
‐ θij is the angle between the slant
direction of sensor i and the normal line on

Figure 12: A geometric representation of the angle θ

the surface of cell j, as shown in Figure 12
‐ fj is the foliage degree of cell j (note: fj an integer score that ranges from 0 to 3,
with 3 being dense foliage)
4. The average slope coverage, which is the average amount of slope (across all traversed cells)
that each system can potentially cover over a mountainous region. The slope coverage (SC) of a
cell is modeled by a percentage that results from dividing the covered range of a mountain (i.e.
the sloping distance that can be feasibly scanned by the specified aerial vehicle) by the total
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(sloping) range. Such a measure can be extremely hard to obtain due to the random shape of
elevated grounds. Nonetheless, a good approximation can be acquired in a much simpler way,
and that is based on supposing that the terrain of every cell is a flat surface with a simple
isosceles‐triangular mountain on top of it, as depicted in Figure 13.

Figure 13: A geometric representation of the slope coverage model for a cell
To ease the construction process of the SC formula, consider the following parameters:


minOA is the minimum operating altitude (above ground level) of the flying system



maxOA is the maximum operating altitude (above sea level) of the flying system



r is the slant‐range of the most powerful sensor mounted on the surveillance system



α is the tilt angle of the most powerful sensor mounted on the surveillance system



β is the (average) slope angle



A is the lowest point of the cell’s mountain



B is the highest point of the cell’s mountain



hA is point A’s elevation (above ground level)



hB is point B’s elevation (above ground level)



hAB is the elevation between point A and point B, i.e. hAB = |hA ‐ hB|
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|AB| is the (land) segment between points A and B, which is equivalent to the
aforementioned total range; this also means that: |AB| = hAB / sin(β)



dA is the distance from which the flying system can spot point A, hence: dA = r . sin(α)



y is the aforementioned covered range (depicted by the orange arrow in Figure 13)



z is the vertical distance between point B and the vehicle at minOA, i.e. z = |minOA ‐ hAB|
From its definition, the slope coverage is formulated as follows:
SC = y / |AB| = y . sin(β) / hAB

However, the variable y is computed in different ways depending on the circumstances that the
surveillance system confronts given the technological limitations r, minOA, and maxOA.
Subsequently, four practical cases are identified, all of which assume that the aerial vehicle can
feasibly fly over the target cell (i.e. maxOA > hB):


Case 1: The aerial vehicle may have to fly so high that point B is missed by the sensors; this
happens when dA + hAB < minOA. In such a case, there is no coverage and y = 0, as
demonstrated in Figure 14.



Case 2: Ideally, the flying system has a sufficiently large slant‐range to capture the whole
mountain; this occurs when hAB < dA (for any minOA that is smaller than maxOA ‐ hA). In such
a scenario, full coverage is attained and y = |AB|, as depicted in Figure 15.



Case 3: The airborne platform may cover the top of the mountain when it flies high enough,
but it is possible that the slant‐range is not long enough to spot point A. This happens when
hAB < minOA and dA < minOA, which leads to y = (dA + hAB ‐ minOA)/sin(β), as shown in Figure
16. Note that this case encompasses Case 1 as dA + hAB < minOA implies hAB < minOA and dA
< minOA; this means that the formula y = max(dA + hAB ‐ minOA, 0)/sin(β) can address both
Case 1 and Case 3.
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Case 4: In the situation where the aerial asset can indeed fly low enough to scan the bottom
of the mountain (i.e. minOA < hAB), spotting point A would depend on the length of the
slant‐range r, and hence the magnitude of dA. In such a scenario, Figure 17 demonstrates
that y = max[(dA + hAB ‐ minOA)/sin(β), |AB|]. Notice there is full coverage if minOA < dA.

Figure 14: The geometric situation for
Case 1 (i.e. dA + hAB < minOA)

Figure 15: The geometric situation for
Case 2 (i.e. hAB < dA)

Figure 16: The geometric situation for
Case 3 (i.e. hAB < minOA and dA < minOA)

Figure 17: The geometric situation for
Case 4 (i.e. minOA < hAB)

All these cases can be integrated in one formulation, and the slope coverage of a surveillance
system for a specific cell can finally be computed as follows (provided that maxOA > hB):
SC = max[max(dA + hAB ‐ minOA, 0) / hAB, 1]
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5. Statistics and relevant information about the generated tours, which span:


The tour length, i.e. the distance traveled to perform the surveillance tour



The travel time, which is the period spends in transportation from one cell to another



The inspection time, which the period an aerial vehicle spends scanning a set of cells



The flight time, i.e. is the sum of the travel and inspection times



The cycle time, i.e. the sum of the flight time and downtime of the associated asset



The set of unreachable cells



The set of cells where the revisit‐time is much higher than required



The highest and average revisit‐times

Note: This set of outputs can also inspire future work such as the incorporation of asset reliability and
maintenance scheduling in the model. We consider these to be out of the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER 4: TERRAIN RISK ASSESSMENT

1. Background

1.1. Fuzzy Set Theory
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) is a concept that extends the classical mathematical notion of sets
(Zadeh, 1978). Instead of having an element be in exactly one of two or more disjoint sets, FST lets this
element to partially belong to more than one set. This is accomplished by defining a membership
function F, whose range is the interval [0,1], for each set S in order to map each element x in S to [0,1].
The value F(x) conveys the extent to which an element x belongs to the set S. A fuzzy set can therefore
be formally defined as a pair (S,F) where S is a (classical) set and F is its membership function.
To illustrate this concept, consider the procedure of boiling cold water. The heating process is
gradual, and the liquid goes through several states—cold, warm, hot—before it reaches the boiling
point. During the transition from one state to another, there is obviously an overlap between some of
the mutually exclusive states (i.e. between cold and warm, and between warm and hot) due to the
gradual nature of change. This overlap can be captured by FST through the definition of three fuzzy sets
for each state with fuzzy functions Fcold, Fwarm, and Fhot. A temperature point x can then simultaneously
belong to all three sets with specific membership degrees such as (Fcold(x), Fwarm(x), Fhot(x)) = (0.5, 0.5, 0).
A more relevant example to this study is the scenario where an analyst is trying to assess the risk
of a set of regions (assume that each region has a risk‐score). This person is interested in assigning the
inspected geo‐locations to one of three sets: low‐risk regions, medium‐risk regions, and high‐risk
regions. The issue of interest is how to draw the border between the low‐risk and medium‐risk sets, as
well as the medium‐risk and high‐risk sets, especially that such categorization can be subjective.
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In this research effort, we focus on the set of regions (or terrain cells) that are high‐risk, or in
other words, assess the degree of their membership to the high‐riskiness set. This is carried out by
constructing a fuzzy membership function based on certain terrain attributes that are believed to give
advantage to the adversary. Subsequently, the fuzzy membership value of a certain geo‐location is
adopted as a risk‐score since FST provides a naturally standardized way to measure how risky an
element is.

1.2. Risk Terrain Modeling
This study identifies an adequate and flexible tool that can be applied in the context of military
surveillance in complex terrain to assist with evaluating how risky a cell can be. Here, risk refers to the
degree of possibility of insurgent presence. This analytical tool is presented by Caplan and Kenedy
(2010) and is called Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM). The authors have used it for criminology analysis to
help the police forecast and locate future violent incidents in different neighborhoods so that the force
can allocate resources more efficiently. Their strategy is based on selecting specific risk‐factors that are
believed or demonstrated to be correlated to the outcome of interest.
For illustration, Caplan and Kennedy provide the example of the gun shooting incident as the
outcome of interest during the period of January 1 to June 31 in Irvington, NJ. The risk‐factors they
consider are: (1) gang members’ residences, (2) retail outlets (e.g. liquor stores, fast‐food places, bus
stops, etc), and (3) areas with high concentration of drug arrests. Each one of these three aspects leads
to the generation of a map, which is converted into a grid of values. The matrix cells are then selected or
unselected through the comparison against a (given) threshold, and are assigned a value of 1 or 0,
respectively. Finally, the grids are added together to create a composite map that shows the hotspots,
which are scored from 1 to 3 (due to the existence of 3 risk‐factors). For illustration, see Figure 18 and
Figure 19.
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Figure 19: A composite map that incorporates
Figure 18: Process of adding up risk‐factors
the
three risk‐factors for the Irvington, NJ study
to obtain the composite map
(Courtesy of Caplan and Kennedy)
A similar strategy is followed in this study in order to identify hotspots in the terrain that is
surrounding the outpost (also referred to as named areas of interest or NAIs in military contexts).
However, two modifications to RTM are explored as a way to adapt the developed analytical tool to the
studied problem. The first modification is concerned with the customization and incorporation of
meaningful risk‐factors as sometimes a lone terrain attribute does not tell the whole story about the risk
level or the reason why a certain cell should be considered as a hotspot. When grouped with other geo‐
characteristics however, they convey a message about a certain scenario that can be valuable at
predicting the attacker’s actions. Consider for instance line‐of‐sight; this attribute does not provide any
value if the region being analyzed is so far away from the outpost that even the most powerful weapon
cannot be used. Another example is the advantage created by being on the higher grounds;
nonetheless, extremely high altitudes that prevent targeting accuracy are quite probably not of any
value. Now, take these two attributes and gather them in one formula along with a reasonable
weapon’s range. When the right distance meets the right altitude with line‐of‐sight, this gives birth to a
situation that is likely to benefit a stealthy opponent; thus, these three measures are treated as a group.
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Similarly, other types of attributes are aggregated into a comprehensive measure, and an associated
score for RTM is generated using a special formula or algorithm, as discussed in the next section.
The second modification on the other hand is related to the prevention of underestimating risk
when assigning scores to grid‐cells. To explain this, consider a fictitious scenario where insurgents favor
strong winds because that situation prevents UAVs from operating, they prefer villages and high‐altitude
caves to temporally settle down, and they use foliage to hide. Then a cell that has a relatively high
altitude, some foliage, high winds, and is close to a village, may be of a tactical advantage to the
adversary, and hence, the higher probability of their presence in this cell. The issue here is that it is
possible for RTM to underestimate the importance of such a cell and dismiss it from the analysis
because the cumulative effect of partial risks is not considered. To be more specific, RTM may assign a
value of 0 to the target cell when generating the risk map associated with foliage—as only the values 1
and 0 are allowed as scores. Consider the case where the degree of foliage is just moderate; as a result,
it is not large enough to qualify for a risk‐score of 1. If however partial risk is permitted—say in the form
of a number between 0 and 1 (e.g. 0.8 for altitude, 0.6 for foliage, 0.9 for winds, and 0.5 for proximity to
the village)—then, the cell would have a different final score from a pure summation of 0’s and 1’s (e.g.
1+0+1+0 < 0.8+0.6+0.9+0.5), a fact that can make a difference in qualifying the target cell to be a
hotspot.
To prevent the case of erroneously eliminating a cell from the risk analysis, FST is employed in
order to address both types of needed modifications in a fluid and approximate fashion rather than a
rigid discrete one. To be more precise, a fuzzy membership function F with an X‐vector input can be
employed to obtain an output between 0 and 1 (i.e. F(X) in [0,1]) to reflect how true is the hotness or
riskiness of such a cell in terms of a certain risk‐factor. Not only does this formulation enable the
incorporation of more than one terrain attribute to obtain a risk‐score, but it also ensures that the
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output measure is in the function’s continuous range [0,1], which adequately eliminates the use of
inaccurate discrete binary values.

2. Risk‐Factors
As previously stated, this study deals with the case where the adversary is smart and has good
situational awareness. Therefore, an effort to predict their behavior is invested through analyzing
different scenarios and taking into consideration multiple aspects that provide tactical advantage to
insurgents. Consequently, five risk‐factors are introduced along with their corresponding fuzzy function
and weight coefficient, a scalar that represents their importance in the process of identifying hotspots:


The foliage camouflage (FC) factor, with a function FFC and a weight wFC



The factor pertaining to proximity to population (PTP), with FPTP as its function and wPTP as its
weight



The factor associated with the potential for long‐range attacks (LRA), with a function FLRA and a
weight wLRA



The factor corresponding to accessibility to regions and spots, with a function FA and a weight wA



The expert input (EI) factor, with a weight wEI (note that no function is provided for this risk‐
factor—whose cell values might be extracted from historical incidents or insight gained from
experience—mainly because it is meant to serve as a way for the analyst or surveillance
architect to manually add other spots that are believed to be high‐risk and missed by the
developed decision tool)
These risk‐factors are derived from a set of terrain attributes such as altitude, foliage, distance,

line‐of‐sight, slope, trafficability, and demographic data. The relationship between each factor and its
relevant attributes is established, modeled within the associated fuzzy membership function, and
thoroughly explained in the forthcoming subsections. Given that the terrain is digitized into a grid of
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cells, each cell j is assigned its corresponding membership values FFC(j), FPTP(j), FLRA(j), FA(j), and FEI(j),
which are later integrated into one weighted average calculation—using the weight coefficients (note
that this necessitates that the five weights sum up to 1). The result is a composite map that is
represented by a grid matrix, whose elements are the final risk‐scores. The cells with high scores are
identified as hotpots.

2.1. Foliage Camouflage
High‐level foliage regions can help intruders hide well and achieve successful steps towards the
COP/OP. Therefore, this aspect has to be considered in a serious manner and should be countered with
appropriate utilization of special technological assets such as thermal sensors. This importance further
intensifies as the adversary’s forces reach nearby spots since they may be able to position themselves in
close and highly strategic positions right before a surprise deadly attack. Consequently, the score
associated with the camouflage factor ought to be a function of both the foliage level and the proximity
to the base. Note that for each cell j in the grid, such a function is to be positively correlated with the
foliage level fj and negatively related to the distance dj from the center of cell j to the centroid of the
outpost. When targeting the high‐riskiness fuzzy set in this context, the camouflage factor can then be
modeled through the following membership function:
FFC(j) = (fj/fmax) . (dmax ‐ dj)/dmax

for every cell j

Note that the division by fmax and dmax ensures that the output of FFC is in the interval [0,1], and
hence the validity of its membership. fmax refers to the highest level of foliage possible, which holds a
value of 3—a standard adopted RAND Corporation; this suggests that the foliage level is in the domain
[0,3]. On the other hand, dmax is the maximal existent distance (from the base) in the grid, which can be
computed through the maximum of the distances from the COP/OP to the four grid’s corners. Figure 20
shows an example where dmax is the distance between the outpost’s cell to the northeast corner cell.

45

Figure 20: A grid setup where the outpost and the target cell j
are in the western half of the grid
2.2. Proximity to Population
For insurgents, proximity to villages can prove very valuable; being amongst civilians does not
only allow them to restock certain supplies and maybe access medical treatment, but it also helps them
blend with the settlers and hide from the enemy. Furthermore, even if their presence is revealed,
attacks might not happen as that would risk losing civilian lives. Another aspect about settlements is
that sometimes population is scattered in smaller groups over a large area rather than grouped in one
large city. In this section, a process is developed to take into consideration these aspects in order to
generate cell scores that are associated with the advantage created by being close to one or more
population settlements. Such a procedure starts by identifying cells in which there are inhabitants; and
the larger the size of the populace, the better for the insurgents. This leads the associated fuzzy function
to be in terms of both the size of and the distance from population settlements. When targeting the
high‐riskiness fuzzy set in this context, such a function is constructed in two steps, the first of which
corresponds to the case where only one cell in the grid has inhabitants; the second step expands the
computation to any number of inhabited cells.
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Step 1: Consider cell i, the only cell in the grid with human settlements, with an aggregate
population size of si. The following formula is adopted to compute the risk‐score of every cell j in
the grid; such a score increases when si increases, and decreases when the distance dij between
the centers of cell i and cell j decreases:
Fi(si,dij) = (si/stotal) . (dmax ‐ dij)/dmax

for every cell j

where stotal refers to the total population of the grid, whereas dmax is the maximal existent
distance in the grid—the diagonal of the grid—as illustrated in the example of Figure 21.Note
that the division by stotal and dmax ensures that the output of Fi is in the interval [0,1], and hence
the validity of its membership.

Figure 21: An example of a terrain grid with four populated cells


Step2: To extend the scenario in the previous step to any number of populated cells—given that
it ought to be encouraged to give more points to a cell that is close to most of the inhabited cells
than a cell that is close to only few of them—the risk‐scores Fi(si,dij) associated with a target cell
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j are aggregated in an average computation as demonstrated in the following formula (also
illustrated in Figure 21):
FPTP(j) = Average{i with Fi(si,dij)≠0}(Fi(si,dij))

for every cell j

2.3. Long‐Range Attacks
Higher altitudes usually give a tactical advantage to the opponent, but not at all times. To
explain, consider the case where the adversary has long‐range arms. Certain regions around the outpost
would generally be ideal for the attacker if three conditions are verified (also depicted in Figure 22):

Figure 22: Illustration of the three ideal conditions and their associated parameters


Condition 1: The geological spot of interest is close enough to the outpost where long‐range
weapons become a threat. Expert feedback reveals that a 3km radius around the base is a good
approximation as it includes ranges for the powerful portable mortars. For notation simplicity,
let C1 represent the logical proposition Condition 1 is verified; i.e., C1 holds a value of true when
the distance between the outpost and the cell of interest is less than 3km.



Condition 2: For weapons to be fired successfully and accurately, the adversary must have line‐
of‐sight from their temporary setup spot. Obstructions not only act as potential barriers for the
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projectile, but they also cause hindrance to the shooter’s precision. A challenge with this
analysis is finding out whether or not a cell has line‐of‐sight of the outpost in a computational
manner. This is addressed by drawing a line from the cell of interest to the closest outpost cell
(center to center) and identifying all the intersections with this line. This reveals the cells that
have to be crossed by the projectile in order to reach the base as illustrated in Figure 23; such
cells are referred to as intermediary cells in this context.

Figure 23: Two examples of finding intermediary cells
These identified cells have to have an elevation that is less than a certain threshold; otherwise,
they constitute an obstacle. For instance, Figure 24 illustrates a case where one cell causes
obstruction between the outpost cell and the cell of interest; these two cells are separated by
six intermediary cells that the line‐of‐sight crosses. To determine this threshold value, which
depends on the proximity of the associated cell to the outpost, consider the following notations:
o

dij is the distance between the centers of cell i and cell j

o

hij is the ASL elevation difference between cell i and cell j

o

Hi is the threshold to exceed in order for a cell i to be an obstruction

o

φ is the angle between the target line‐of‐sign and sea level
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Figure 24: An Illustration of a cell causing obstruction
For an intermediate cell i (between the outpost cell O and the target cell j), the following
equation can be derived from the geometry presented in Figure 24:
tan(φ) = hjO/djO = Hi/diO
Hence:
Hi = diO . hjO / djO
In conclusion, there is an unblocked line‐of‐sight between a target cell j and an outpost cell O if
and only if for every intermediary cell i, the threshold value Hi is larger than (diO . hjO / djO). For
notation simplicity, let C2 represent the logical proposition Condition 2 is verified; i.e., C2 holds a
value of true when line‐of‐sight between the outpost and the cell of interest is not obstructed.


Condition C3: High altitudes in this scenario help in two ways. First, they render it difficult to
spot and reach the opponent (if spotted). Second, they make it easier on the shooter to strike
the outpost with a firearm attack. However, this is only correct if the elevation is not great
enough to cause targeting problems. According to experts, a difference of ho=150m in elevation
is ideal, and beyond hmax=300m is ineffective. When targeting the high‐riskiness fuzzy set in this
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context, we adopt the fuzzy function depicted in Figure 25—whose input shall be hjO, the
elevation difference between a given cell j and the outpost cell O.
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Figure 25: The fuzzy membership function in terms of elevation difference hjO (in meters)
Lastly, the three conditions are to be integrated in one function. Given the Boolean nature of
the first and second conditions as well as the fuzzy membership function associated with Condition 3, a
score for the LRA risk‐factor can be computed for every cell in the grid as follows:

FLRA(j) =

hjO / ho
(hmax ‐ hjO) / (hmax ‐ ho)
0

if 0 < hjO < ho & C1 & C2
if ho < hjO < hmax & C1 & C2
otherwise

for every cell j

Note: the symbol & in the above formula refers to the logic‐and operator.

2.4. Accessibility to Regions
A geo‐location might be of a high tactical advantage, but it becomes useless if it is not
accessible. In this section, the concept of accessibility is developed through several steps to attain a
formula that considers the relevant attributes.
First, consider an adversary who is very familiar and comfortable with complex terrain; as a
result, he is less likely to be bothered by high slopes, and is more likely to take high‐slope paths as they
are less predictable by his enemies. However, there is a limit on how steep terrain can be to yield
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advancement as too much slope starts becoming a hindrance (usually of an angle between 45 and 60
degrees), especially if a heavy weapon is carried. For modeling purposes, let βo be the angle at which
slope starts becoming a burden, and let βmax be the angle at which slope prevents advancement. When
targeting the high‐riskiness fuzzy set in this context, a helper fuzzy function that is based purely on slope
is modeled through the following formula (an instance of which is plotted in Figure 26):
1
(βmax ‐ βj) / (βmax ‐ βo)
0

Fβ(βj) =

if 0 < βj < βo
if βo < βj < βmax
otherwise
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Figure 26: The fuzzy membership function Fβ given that βo = 45o and βmax = 60o
This leads to the next point, which is: given a spot that has high but manageable slope, it is
valuable only if it is actually accessible from other regions. In other words, if it is surrounded by steep‐
terrain cells, it is most likely avoided by insurgents, even if it turns out to have apt characteristics such as
a fair amount of foliage, proximity to the outpost, line‐of‐sight, etc. This perspective adds a bit more
complexity to the aspect of accessibility as cells with attractive attributes become even more valuable if
they are easily accessible and allow access to other attractive cells. Therefore, when evaluating the slope
βj for a specific cell j, two questions are raised: (1) Is cell j accessible through its adjacent cells? (2) Does
cell j give accessibility to its surrounding cells? Such aspects can be captured by incorporating the slope‐
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based scores of the adjacent cells through a calculation of average when seeking the accessibility risk‐
score of the target cell, as follows:
[Fβ(βj) + ∑{i adjacent to j} Fβ(βi)] / kj
where kj is the number of surrounding cells of cell j (note: kj is equal to 3 for corner cells, 5 for edge cells,
and 8 for inside cells).
Last but not least, there is a missing exception to the fact that a stealthy adversary is more likely
to avoid flat land and low‐slope areas because that is too obvious or predictable. Yet, if a fairly flat path
is highly trafficable, it might be used by vehicles to reach the base in a short timeframe. Swift attacks
have shown in past events to be effective in inflicting serious damage, even when predictable paths are
taken. This notion of trafficability is hence used to expand the concept of accessibility to account for
swift attacks. To understand this newly introduced measure, which is a function of the terrain’s soil
texture and water saturation, consider the following figures:

Figure 27: Trafficability assessment and categorization for dry terrain
(Courtesy of RAND Corporation)
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Figure 28: Trafficability assessment and categorization for moist terrain
(Courtesy of RAND Corporation)

Figure 29: Trafficability assessment and categorization for a full‐saturation terrain
(Courtesy of RAND Corporation)
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Table 4: Legend for Figure 27, Figure 28, and Figure 29
Trafficability Assessment

Code

Fair

2

Poor

1

No‐go

0

As can be seen from these charts, there is a decent amount of situations when land is fairly
trafficable. Therefore, this attribute has to be captured in the analysis when terrain is believed to be flat
enough. This can be achieved through the fuzzy function plotted in Figure 30, given that the trafficability
of cell j is represented by a scalar tj in the domain [0,2], and that the slope angle is less than a threshold
value βmin (usually about 30o).
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Figure 30: The fuzzy membership function in terms of trafficability tj
Finally, by combining the two discussed attributes—slope and trafficability—into one function,
the accessibility risk factor can be computed for every cell in the grid as follows:

FA(j) =

(tj ‐ 1) . [Fβ(βj) + ∑{i adjacent to j} Fβ(βi)] / kj
[Fβ(βj) + ∑{i adjacent to j} Fβ(βi)] / kj
0
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if 0 < βj < βmin & 1 < tj < 2
if βmin < βj
otherwise

for every cell j

3. Composite Map
To recapitulate, five risk‐factors are introduced along with their relationship with terrain
attributes. The presented methodology is based on treating terrain attributes as inputs, extracting risk‐
scores for each factor in the form of a grid matrix, and combining these matrices into a composite map
(as shown in Figure 31).

Figure 31: The process used in terrain evaluation in order to generate the composite map
To be more specific, geological characteristics such as slope, altitude, foliage, along with demographical
information, are intelligently combined to produce formulas that yield the generation of scores for each
risk‐factor. Such scores convey the degree of how desirable a geo‐location can be to insurgents, and
hence, their risk level. Each one of the risk‐scores stems from a fuzzification process, which helps ensure
that the output number is in the range [0,1]. After all the risk‐factor’s scores are computed, they are
aggregated through a weighted average to produce an RTM‐based composite map, whose matrix
elements are denoted by Risk(j) and are guaranteed to carry values between 0 and 1:
Risk(j) = wFC . FFC(j) + wPTP . FPTP(j) + wLRA . FLRA(j) + wA . FA(j) + wEI . FEI(j)
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where: wFC + wPTP + wLRA + wA + wEI = 1
Weights can be adjusted by the user of the analytical framework to reflect different degrees of
importance amongst the factors. Notice that this method is flexible as it allows an easy integration of
other attributes and factors, assuming the score‐generating function is appropriately constructed. Once
the risk‐scores are computed and the final (composite map) matrix is generated, the user can then
choose the threshold at which a cell can be considered as a hotspot. Alternatively, s/he can opt to use a
certain percentile to separate the high‐risk cells from the rest.
The cell scores happen to have additional usefulness, and that is associated with the frequency
at which they have to be revisited during the surveillance process. In other words, the higher the risk of
a hotspot, the shorter the revisit‐time for this cell ought to be. This fact can be reflected through a
function that converts the cell score Risk(j) to a revisit‐time τj, which is later used in a time‐based
resource allocation of assets as part of building the surveillance plan. Such function can be sophistically
constructed or be as simple as an interval‐based or linear one, depending on how the risk‐scores are
distributed and how the analyst wants to handle the conversion procedure.
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CHAPTER 5: TOUR GENERATION

1. Concept
As seen in the previous chapter, the terrain risk assessment phase ends with generating a list of
high‐risk geo‐locations (called hotspots) that need to be visited regularly for surveillance purposes.
These hotspots basically constitute a subset of the cells in the digitization grid that has been already
established. To model the motion of a mobile platform in such a structure, every grid cell is represented
as a node, and an edge is created to link such a node to its adjacent nodes, as shown in Figure 32. The
motion of a vehicle from a cell to another cell is assumed to be a center‐to‐center vertical, horizontal, or
diagonal move on the 2D grid.

Figure 32: The network infrastructure obtained from transforming the 2D digitization grid
This representation provides a network infrastructure that supports the construction of tours
comprising (hopefully all) high‐risk nodes along their paths. These tours however are only generated for
tactical assets (such as the Shadow and the Raven) as this process is obviously inappropriate for
stationary assets (e.g. towers and aerostats), and inadequate for strategic systems since they fly at high
altitudes and are able to scan large areas, generally at detection level. To clarify some more, the purpose
of planning routes for tactical vehicles is to find low‐altitude paths—which are not always guaranteed to
be feasible—in order to approach high‐risk regions as closely as possible and perform a surveillance
routine at identification level.
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Nonetheless, generating such tours is a challenging task because several complex issues have to
be considered at this stage. First, the tour has to consist of a sequence of visits and paths that minimize
fuel consumption. Second, only cells and edges that are feasibly traversable by the UAV are to be
selected. Third, an apt operating altitude has to be found in a way that achieve acceptable image
resolution with adequate stealth, while avoiding unnecessary altitude changes that lead to more
fuel/battery (or endurance) consumption. Fourth, the computational expense of solving such a complex
problem grows polynomially with the number of nodes, and edges eventually. Lastly, this analysis has to
be performed for every tactical UAV.

Figure 34: Synthetic flight tours planned for the
RQ‐11 Raven (two infeasible spots)

Figure 33: Synthetic flight tours planned for the
RQ‐7 Shadow (no infeasible spots)

Note that this route generation phase is expected to produce different results for each tactical
vehicle as they have different capabilities. To illustrate this point, consider planning two surveillance
missions, one with the RQ‐7 Shadow and the other one with the RQ‐11 Raven, for the same set of
regions. For this, a fictitious scenario is presented in Figure 33 and Figure 34 as an example. Notice that
the shadow is able to visit all the required spots in two tours, with the need to refuel only once. The
Raven however cannot visit the northwestern point because it is situated on high grounds. The UAV also

59

misses the southeastern spot because it is too far from the outpost and requires more endurance to be
reached. Moreover, this aircraft’s battery needs to be recharged three times, which increases idle‐time
during the mission. As can be seen, the Shadow might be favored over the Raven with respect to most
characteristics; still, the latter has to be considered as it requires fewer personnel than the former, and
might actually be chosen to carry out the mission for that specific reason.
In order to handle the complexity of the path planning process for each one of the considered
UAVs, an approach with diverse techniques is exploited. Firstly, the tour generation problem is
partitioned into a series of sequential sub‐problems (or stages), which is a divide‐and‐conquer tactic that
helps lessen the involved difficulty. Such sub‐problems include the Traveling Salesman Problem (to
determine the sequence in which the set of appropriate hotspots are to be visited), the Shortest Path
Problem (to find the shortest path from one hotspot to another), and tour segmentation (to generate
subtours that can be feasibility traveled given the endurance of the specified UAV). Secondly, a select
subset of the constraints of interests is addressed outside the introduced Mathematical Programming
formulations. Let such a group be referred to as exogenous constraints; subsequently, let endogenous
constraints be defined in this context as the restraints that are explicitly formulated within the
optimization models. The benefits that stem from handling constraints exogenously are twofold: (1) the
number of endogenous constrains is reduced, which leads to smaller search spaces for the MP solvers
(i.e. a smaller set of extreme points); and (2) the established network infrastructure can be reduced by
filtering out the nodes that fail the verification of exogenous constraints, which leads to smaller input
data sets for the MP solvers (i.e. less node and edges to choose from), and hence faster runtimes. Table
5 reveals the identified constraints, their classification, and the stage in which they are integrated.
Table 5: Types of involved constraints and their stage of integration
Constraint
Type
Solution Stage
Compatibility*
Exogenous
Input data processing
Payload*
Exogenous
Input data processing

60

Communication range
Exogenous
Pre‐TSP
Terrain elevation
Exogenous
Pre‐TSP
Wind level
Exogenous
Pre‐TSP
Min/max operating altitude
Endogenous
Altitude Optimization
Climb‐/dive‐rate
Endogenous
Altitude Optimization
Noise (dB‐) distance
Endogenous
Altitude Optimization
Sensing distance
Endogenous
Altitude Optimization
Endurance
Exogenous
Hotspot elimination, tour segmentation
Wireless interference
Negligible
‐
Turn radius
Out of scope
‐
*Note: it is assumed that the constraints associated with the compatibility between the
platform and its sensors as well as the non‐exceeded payload capacity of the platform are
satisfied at this point, as they are easily verified at the beginning of the computation run
through simple checks (especially that the compatibility matrix is very sparse).
Thirdly, an efficient way that yields the consideration of the third spatial dimension is sought.
With such a mindset, modeling space using a 3D grid is avoided as it renders the problem unnecessarily
much larger. Instead, a different approach is adopted to achieve the 3D aspect of the problem: after the
2D flight paths are found, each node in these paths is coupled with a new variable that shall specify a
feasible operating altitude of the target UAV at that cell.
As a result of this multi‐technique approach, a sequence of computational stages is established
(as depicted in Figure 35) to solve the tour generation problem:


Stage 1: a network reduction is performed by employing the appropriate exogenous constraints
to evaluate the grid cells and eliminate the nodes that are infeasible or unreachable, along with
the appropriate edges. The outcome of such a process is a leaner network infrastructure that
shall ease the computations in the forthcoming steps.



Stage 2: the high‐level strategy of conducting surveillance over the reachable hotspots is devised
by attaining an optimized sequence of visits through a TSP solution that is based on approximate
distances. The objective of such optimization is to minimize the traveled distance by the UAV in
order to expedite the cycle of visits and reduce energy depletion.
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Figure 35: The sequence of steps to generate (sub)tours for a UAV


Stage 3: each two consecutive nodes in the generated TSP sequence need to be connected by a
feasible and efficient path; this is achieved by solving the Shortest Path Problem for each TSP
segment. Note that an alternative (non‐adopted) strategy is to solve the SPP for any pair of
hotspots and find a more accurate travel cost before solving the TSP; however, the computation
time would be much greater, while the tour is expected to change just a bit. Conversely, the
current framework executes the SPP model only when necessary, which leads the computation
to run in a much faster fashion.
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Stage 4: this step of the process is concerned with determining the most adequate operating
altitude at each traversed cell in the UAV’s trip. The vector comprising the set of OA variables is
resolved using a custom linear program, through which flight climbs and dives are planned such
that the sensing distance and stealth constraints are verified while the change in operating
altitude is feasibly minimized.



Stage 5: Tour segmentation is a conditional routine as it is executed only when the generated
surveillance trip is too long to be handled by the aerial vehicle. In that case, the endurance
constraint is used to split this 3D tour into subtours so as to obtain a feasible flight plan.

Each one of these stages is explained in more details in the forthcoming subsections.

2. Network Reduction
When a grid is represented as a set of nodes and edges as mentioned previously, the network
seems to have a very robust infrastructure with a large amount of redundancies. However, depending
on the capability of the utilized UAV, several of these nodes and edges may not be possible to traverse,
especially if the terrain has a complex geo‐surface and is frequently subject to harsh weather conditions.
Therefore, the concept of exogenous constraints is employed to reduce the preliminary network
infrastructure for every UAV considered in the analysis before the commencement of the tour
generation. This is achieved through the comparison of the platform’s characteristics against the terrain
attributes. To be more specific, for a node to be feasible (for a certain UAV), it has to satisfy the
following constraints: (1) its elevation has to be low enough so the UAV can fly over it, (2) its location
has to be within the communication range of the UAV, and (3) its wind level has to be low enough not to
disturb the flight of the UAV.
In case of infeasibility, the node and its associated edges are omitted from the network. This
may give birth to other phenomena: islands, isolated nodes, and infrastructure holes, as depicted in
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Figure 36. When nodes and edges are omitted from the network, and islands and isolated nodes appear,
some cells become unreachable. That being said, reachable nodes can be computationally identified by
solving the SPP from an outpost cell to the target cell. If this target cell is a hotspot, the found shortest
path is referred to as a link, because it links the outpost to the surveillance tour. A link also helps identify
and address another type of unreachability, which is related to the case where the traveled path is too
long for the UAV to endure during a round‐trip. The endurance constraint can therefore be used to
further omit nodes that are too far from the outpost. (Note that for computational efficiency purposes,
the check for unreachability can be performed on hotspots only instead of all cells, and this would not
alter the outcome of the analysis.)

Figure 36: Three network infrastructures associated with three different UAVs
As a result of identifying infeasible and unreachable cells, the original list of high‐risk regions has
to be adjusted. To explain, any hotspot that coincides with an unfeasible or unreachable node has to be
omitted from the analysis for the currently evaluated UAV. To visualize this, consider the real‐world
example depicted in Figure 37, which shows the proposed surveillance tour based on 30 randomly
generated hotspots for the Shadow in the 5x5 km2 Wanat region that surrounds COP Kahler. The colors
significance is as follows: hotspots in red, outpost cells in green, network infrastructure in black, links in
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cyan, and the surveillance tour in orange. Notice that because of the network reduction, 14 out of the
30 hotspots are excluded from the UAV’s trajectory (mostly because of high elevation or strong winds).
Moreover, one of these cells—called Cell A in the figure—is situated in an infrastructure hole that is
close to the outpost. As for islands, there seems to be none in this case.

Figure 37: The reduced network for the RQ‐7 Shadow in a 5x5 km2 Wanat region
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3. Tour Construction

3.1. TSP Heuristic
Now that a virtual transportation infrastructure is constructed, and only the feasible and
reachable hotspots are included in the analysis, the next step is to generate an efficient sequence of
high‐risk cells to be visited through the surveillance tour. This is achieved by solving the (unconstrained)
Traveling Salesman Problem using the formulation below, by Miller et al. (1960). In this context, the cost
of traveling from one node to another is the Euclidean distance between them (which is assumed to be
linearly proportional to the UAV’s endurance). The AMPL code for such a formulation, provided by Lee
and Raffensperger (2006), is included in Section 1 of the Appendix.
n
cij

number of nodes
cost of travelling from node i to node j

xij
yi

1 if trip from node i to node j is chosen, 0 otherwise
number of so‐far visited nodes when at node i

S.t.

Min ∑{i in 1..n, j in 1..n, i≠j} cij . xij
∑{i in 1..n, i≠j} xij = 1
∑{j in 1..n, i≠j} xij = 1
yi ‐ yj + n . xij < n ‐ 1
xij in {0,1}
yi > 0 and integer

∀j in 1..n
∀i in 1..n
∀i in 2..n, ∀j in 2..n, i ≠ j
∀i in 1..n, ∀j in 1..n
∀i in 1..n

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Constraints (1) and (2) ensure that every node is entered and left exactly once, whereas constraint (3)
prevents incomplete tours (i.e. tours having less than n nodes).
The problem with solving the TSP with an exact method is the polynomial growth of the
problem size, whereas in this study, a good approximation is sufficient. Consequently, an efficient
heuristic is developed, and its performance is compared against that of the CPLEX solver, as shown in
Table 6. This heuristic is inspired from the fact that solving a TSP with n nodes is much computationally
expensive than solving two TSPs with n total nodes and then linking the two resultant subtours together.
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In addition, the presence of a grid structure renders it easy to split geographical locations and acquire
appropriate subsets of nodes.

Figure 38: Dividing the grid into two subgrids in order to solve two smaller TSPs
The algorithm first checks if the given node list is small enough and solves the TSP exactly if it is
the case. Otherwise, it uses a recursive scheme to construct and solve two subproblems with two node
sublists that are attained by dividing the input subgrid in half, either horizontally or vertically in an
alternative manner. To join the two subsolutions, a breakpoint is needed to create an opening in each of
the subtours and linking them through those gaps. To intelligently determine such a breakpoint, one
dummy node representing the first node list is acquired by computing the grid coordinates of the
centroid of this cluster (xc1 = ∑i xi/n1, yc1 = ∑i yi/n1) and added to the second sublist; the first sublist is also
adjusted in a similar fashion. To visualize this, consider Figure 38. These dummy nodes constitute good
breakpoints as they provide a good approximation of where a subtour can be geographically extended
to encompass another subtour. Eventually, these dummy nodes are removed right before connecting
the two TSP subsolutions, as shown in Figure 39. The way the two broken tours are linked together is by
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connecting each of their two ends with their counterparts in a least cost fashion. Depending on how
many TSP divisions occur during the heuristic’s execution, the process of joining subtours is repeated
accordingly until a complete TSP solution is acquired.

Figure 39: The process of removing the breakpoints and connecting the two subtours
The associated recursive algorithm can therefore be described by the following steps (whose
corresponding pseudo‐code can be found in Section 2 of the Appendix):
(0) Obtain the input pair, a (sub)grid and its associated hotspots (i.e. node list), either from the
passed parameters at the start of the main (tour construction) procedure or from the previously
called recursive function.
(1) If the number of nodes is less than a pre‐specified threshold (a value of 25 is used here), solve
the TSP exactly using the above integer program, and then go to step (7). Else, go to step (2).
(2) Divide the (sub)grid into two equal halves, Subgrid 1 and Subgrid 2, as shown in Figure 38.
Subsequently, the list of hotspots is divided into Sublist 1 whose elements reside in Subgrid 1,
and Sublist 2 whose elements reside in Subgrid 2. Note that the division ought to be carried out
in a vertical fashion if the number of columns in the input grid is larger than the number of its
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rows. Otherwise, the divider is to split the structure horizontally. (This scheme eventually results
in an alternation between vertical and horizontal cuts in the consecutive recursive calls.)
(3) For each of the two subgrids, find the center of gravity (or centroid) for the corresponding
hotspot sublists. Let c1 be the centroid of Sublist 1, and c2 be the centroid of Sublist2; similarly,
let n1 be the size of Sublist 1, and n2 be the size of Sublist 2. The coordinates are computed as
follows: (xc1, yc1) = (∑i xi/n1, ∑i yi/n1) and (xc2, yc2) = (∑i xi/n2, ∑i yi/n2); note that rounding is allowed
since a good approximation is sufficient.
(4) Add c1 as a dummy node in Sublist 2, and c2 as a dummy node in Sublist 1, as depicted in Figure
38.
(5) Solve the two resulting TSP subproblems by executing these very steps (0)‐(7) on the input pairs
(Subgrid 1, Sublist 1) and (Subgrid 2, Sublist 2).
(6) Join the two solutions acquired in step (5); this is achieved by treating the dummy nodes c1 and
c2 as breakpoints to create an opening in every subtour before linking them together as
demonstrated in Figure 39. Note that these breakpoints are removed completely from the
analysis at this point, and that the two broken subtours are combined by connecting their
closest ends.
(7) Return the obtained solution to the previously called recursive function, or to the calling main
procedure if the recursion is finished.
To evaluate and validate this heuristic, seven experiments are performed on a Dell Latitude
D630 with 2GB of RAM and a 1.86GHz Intel® Core™ 2 Duo processor: the TSP is solved for n randomly
generated hotspots on a 115x115 grid. Table 6 reveals three aspects that are associated with each
experiment: (1) the size of the problem in terms of the number of nodes, variables, and non‐integrality
constraints (in non‐closed form); (2) the performance of the integer program solver CPLEX; and (3) the
performance of the developed heuristic along with its optimality gap from the optimal solution. The
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results show that the heuristic gives good results as the optimality gap is less than 10%. Moreover, this
algorithm proves to be computationally efficient since it runs much faster as the problem size increases
and does not greedily deplete memory resources.
Table 6: A comparison of the heuristic against CPLEX in terms of solution quality and runtime
N
Variables Constraints
Optimal Runtime
Heuristic Runtime Optimality Gap
10
110
92
1356.74 0.02s
1356.74 0.02s
0%
30
930
872
2136.46 5.50s
2283.46 0.32s
6.7%
50
2550
2452
2697.18 5.37min
2724.47 2.61s
1%
75
5700
5552
3078.09 39.14min
3172.72 9.94s
3%
100 10100
9902
3428.14 6.11h
3753.38 15.20s
9.4%
150 22650
22352
OOM
‐
4929.58 39.98s
‐
300 90300
89702
OOM
‐
7189.65 22.671s ‐
* OOM ~ Out of memory (by CPLEX)
To conclude, this heuristic is ideal for this study because it is practically fast at yielding a good
solution. Furthermore, it enjoys other traits such as being: (1) computationally inexpensive, as it does
not require the use of a significant amount of memory to maintain a solution population and perform
overhead comparisons); (2) deterministic, so it is more predictable and less prone to the victimization of
randomness; (3) not dependent on a specified number of iterations (unlike search algorithms whose
solution quality depends on the number of iterations performed); (4) easy to tune as it only has one
input parameter (i.e. the threshold value); and (5) a mechanism that easily enforces endogenous
constraints—should the need to incorporate constraints arise—as it uses mathematical modeling.

3.2. SPP Grid Reduction
Upon attaining a near‐optimal sequence of visits to high‐risk cells, the next step is to determine
the best path from each node to its subsequent one by solving the (unconstrained) Shortest Path
Problem. While this can be achieved by employing well‐established efficient algorithms such as Bellman‐
Ford or Dijkstra, this study prefers solving this problem using an IP formulation because Mathematical
Programing allows the enforcement of endogenous constraints, should the need for that arises during
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future development or expansion. One example of such a restraint is related to the integration of turn‐
radii in the UAV’s path. In this case, solving the SPP is accomplished via the formulation introduced in
Carlyle et al. (2008), which is structured in a way that supports additional linear constraints. In this
context, the cost of selecting an edge is equivalent to its geographical approximated length (distance);
this helps acquire paths that consume the least amount of energy as well as save the largest amount of
time. The unconstrained version of Carlyle et al.’s formulation is as follows, and its associated AMPL
code is provided in Section 3 of the Appendix:
V
E
ce
bv
ave

set of vertices/nodes
set of directed edges
cost of travelling through edge e
1 if node v is the origin, ‐1 if it is the destination, and 0 otherwise
1 if node v is the start of edge e, ‐1 if v is the end of e, and 0 otherwise

xe

1 if edge i is selected to be in the path, and 0 otherwise

S.t.

Min ∑{e in E} ce . xe
∑{e in E} ave . xe = bv
xe in {0,1}

∀v in V
∀e in E

(1)
(2)

Note that the decision of choosing the IP formulation over efficient SPP algorithms assumes that the
practical speed of the developed framework is not compromised. If this assumption does not hold
anymore because of a certain problem size or a newly added set of (endogenous) constraints in the SPP
model, the Lagrangian‐Relaxation‐based algorithm developed by Carlyle et al.’s (2008) can be employed
to improve computation efficiency.
Regardless of the solution method, an opportunity for improvement in terms of runtime is
seized before solving the apt SPPs (one for each pair in the TSP sequence), and that is based on the
observation that in a dense grid structure, a significantly large number of edges are not selected to be a
part of the shortest path. This fact inspires the idea of engaging only a subset of edges—ones that are
more likely to be in the shortest path between two cells—to decrease the amount of required
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computation. To elaborate, consider the example in Figure 40, which shows that such trajectory is
situated within a virtual subgrid where one of the two diagonally opposite corner pairs comprises the
origin and destination cells. Notice that given there are no network disconnections that prevent a SPP
feasible solution within this subgrid, the shortest trajectory is always contained within this virtual
structure. If however the origin and destination are somehow disconnected within the subgrid (as
depicted in Figure 41), the shortest path then comprises edges from the outside of the virtual structure
(assuming there is a feasible solution).

Figure 40: A subgrid comprising the origin, destination, and shortest path

Figure 41: A subgrid comprising the origin and destination, but not the shortest path
To exploit this notion of solving SPP within a smaller scope while mitigating the risk of falling in
the situation where no feasible solution exists within the virtual structure, the original NxN grid is
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reduced to a subgrid that has some leeway around the contour defined by the origin and destination. To
be more specific, if the thickness of this leeway is measured with the number of cells, then such a
subgrid is defined by the following bounding rows and columns:


North boundary:

max(min(Roworigin, Rowdestination) ‐ leeway, 0)



South boundary:

min(max(Roworigin, Rowdestination) + leeway, N‐1)



West boundary:

max(min(Columnorigin, Columndestination) ‐ leeway, 0)



East boundary:

min(max(Columnorigin, Columndestination) + leeway, N‐1)

Note: in this study, the leeway thickness is set to 5 cells, though it can be reset to any adequate number.
Furthermore, if such allowance is not enough, it can be intelligently increased or even maximized to
contain the whole grid; this case however is less likely to happen, and it should only be invoked as a last
resort.
Using this network reduction method along with an exact method solver to find all the shortest
paths associated with the TSP tour proves to be a practically fast mechanism; and in the case of the
50x50 grid example given in Figure 37, test data for multiple hotspots scenarios shows that the use of
this reduction technique reduces runtime by half.

4. Altitude Optimization
After effectively and efficiently acquiring a set of 2D surveillance paths for the tactical UAVs, it is
important to switch focus to the third dimension—the operating altitude. This does not only reveal how
complex the flight might be, but it also enables the computation of the extra energy required for all the
altitude changes during the trip, and hence, leading to a more accurate verification of the endurance
constraint (as discussed in the next section). Consequently, the UAV’s operating altitude associated with
each cell in a specific target path is resolved subject to the following set of endogenous constraints:

73

1. The minimum/maximum operating altitude constraints, which ensure that the UAV does not
fly below or above its lower or upper altitude limits, respectively. Note however that it is
important to distinguish between above ground level (AGL) altitudes and above (mean) seal level
(ASL/MSL) altitudes. Usually, the given data for minOA’s is given in AGL whereas its maxOA
counterpart is given in ASL (as shown in Figure 13), and this is the standard followed in this
study.
2. The climb‐/dive‐rate constraint, which helps verify that the UAV does not perform a change of
altitude that exceed its climb and dive capabilities when moving from one cell to another.
3. The stealth constraint, which ensures that the UAV flies above its dB‐distance, the distance that
reveals its presence through its noise. Note that the dB‐distance parameter is an AGL altitude.
An important aspect about this constraint is that unlike its aforementioned counterparts, its
violation does not physically handicap or forbid the UAV’s flight. Furthermore, it would not be
appropriate to refuse a good solution just because this constraint is violated by a small degree.
As a result, this study treats it as a soft constraint (whose violation does not lead to infeasibility),
and this is achieved by introducing an allowance (a.k.a. deficiency or elasticity) variable that
would be minimized with a certain importance or priority in the objective function.
4. The sensing distance constraint, which verifies that the UAV is flying at an altitude that enables
its onboard sensors to obtain a high image quality, at least at the level of vehicle detection.
However, this restriction is also treated in this study as a soft constraint as it is not
recommended to disregard a solution just because the image quality at a certain cell is a little
below the required threshold. This becomes even more important after realizing that the
struggle to satisfy this constraint might be an objective that conflicts with satisfying the stealth
constraint. To clarify this, maximizing image resolution drives the UAV to be closer to the ground
while maximizing stealth pushes the aerial asset away from the earth surface
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As for the objectives, the below three measures are identified:


According to discussions with experts in the area, one of the factors involved in determining the
appropriate operating altitude for a UAV is minimizing the change in ASL altitudes. This not only
helps keep the endurance consumption to a minimum, but it also simplifies the task of the
controller during the surveillance shift as s/he does not have to keep up with all the flight climbs
and dives. As for the endurance consumption itself (which is measured in time), it can be easily
computed outside of the developed optimization model without affecting the accuracy of the
analysis because this measure is positively proportional to ASL altitude changes.



The second objective is a result of treating the sensing
distance restriction as a soft constraint. In other words,
the image resolution becomes part of the optimization
model’s objective function. As introduced in Chapter 3,
the formula for computing the image resolution
Figure 42: The geometric situation at
a given cell

acquired by a specific UAV is as follows:

Ri = (1000 . s/r) . cos(θi) . (1 ‐ fj/3)
Where: ‐ Ri is the acquired image resolution at cell i
‐ s is the sensitivity (power) of the UAV’s sensor
‐ r is the slant range of the UAV’s sensor
‐ θi is the angle between the slant direction of the UAV’s sensor and the normal
line on the surface of cell i, as shown in Figure 42
‐ fi is the foliage degree (an integer score that ranges from 0 to 3) of cell i
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Let xi be the AGL operating altitude of the UAV at cell i, let βi be the slope angle at cell i, and let
α be the tilt angle of the UAV’s sensor, as demonstrated in Figure 42. Hence, two geometric
expressions can be derived: sin(α) = xi/r and θi = π ‐ α ‐ βi. For simplicity purposes during the
optimization process, assume that the terrain at cell i is flat, i.e. βi = 0; this way, xi can be kept
constant over cell i. Thus, the image resolution formula becomes as follows:
Ri = (1000 . s . sin(α)/xi) . cos(π ‐ α) . (1 ‐ fi/3)
This mathematical expression however renders it cumbersome to utilize in a MP formulation as
it is nonlinear and involves a number of parameters. To ease this matter while still pursuing the
same goal, this part of the objective function is set to xmax such that xmax > xi for all i in arg{path
nodes} since this still optimizes the operating altitude to maximize the image quality at each
node (which is inversely proportional to xi). Furthermore, xmax yields the same measurement unit
as the other objectives, eliminating by that the need for conversion and calibration.


Similarly, stealth is treated as a soft constraint, which leads to the third objective function that
tries to achieve the minimal allowable violation through the sum of all allowances across all
traversed nodes.
The result of such a discussion is the following linear program (referred to as OAP, and whose

AMPL code can be found in Section 4 of the Appendix):
V
E
ei
dij
rc
rd
aL
aU
adB
wδ

set of cells (i.e. vertices/nodes) in UAV’s path
set of edges in UAV’s path (including links)
elevation (above sea level) of cell i
distance between cell i and cell j (center to center)
UAV’s maximum climb‐rate
UAV's maximum dive‐rate
UAV's operating altitude lower bound (above ground level)
UAV's operating altitude upper bound (above sea level)
UAV's dB‐distance (above ground level)
objective weight associated with change in operating altitude
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wx
wz

objective weight associated with operating altitude (i.e. sensing distance)
objective weight associated with stealth

xi
xmax
yi
δmax
zi

UAV's operating altitude (above ground level) at cell i
UAV’s maximum operating altitude across all nodes (above ground level)
UAV's operating altitude (above sea level) at cell i
UAV’s maximum operating altitude change across all edges
allowance for violating stealth constraint at cell i

S.t.

Min wδ . δmax + wx . xmax + wz . ∑{i in V} zi
yi = xi + ei
∀i in V
∀i in V
xi > aL
yi < a U
∀i in V
yi ‐ yj < min(rc, rd) . dij
∀(i,j) in E
yj ‐ yi < min(rc, rd) . dij
∀(i,j) in E
yi ‐ yj < δmax
∀(i,j) in E
yj ‐ yi < δmax
∀(i,j) in E
xi + zi > adB
∀i in V
xi < xmax
∀i in V
xi > 0, yi > 0, zi > 0
∀i in V
xmax > 0, δmax > 0

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

Constraint (1) establishes a relationship between the corresponding xi and yi variables. Constraints (2)
and (3) force the sought operating altitude to be within the UAV’s limits. Constraints (4) and (5) ensure
that an edge (i,j) can be crossed in both directions without exceeding the vehicle’s diving and climbing
rate limits. Constraints (6) and (7) together force the variable δmax to carry the largest value of all the
changes in operating altitudes. Constraint (8) establishes a relationship between the corresponding xi
and zi variables. Constraint (9) ensures that xmax holds the highest value across all xi variables (i.e. the
maximum AGL operating altitude found so far). Lastly, constraints (10) and (11) are to guarantee that all
involved variables are nonnegative. As for the multi‐objective function, it comprises a weighted
summation of three main terms that are associated with the three aspects previously discussed: change
in altitude, sensing distance, and stealth. Note: these weights sum up to 1 (i.e. wδ + wx + wz = 1).
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Integrating weight multipliers (i.e. wδ, wx, and wz) in
the three‐objective function and treating them as input
parameters gives the surveillance architect flexibility in
redefining his/her priorities with regards to determining the
right operating altitude. For instance, the analyst may regard
the captured image resolution as all that matters; in this case,
s/he can assign the following values: (wδ, wx, wz) = (0, 1, 0). It is
noteworthy however that the user of this developed decision

Figure 43: Example mimicking a
hotspot

tool should pay great attention to the values assigned to these weight parameters as they can lead to
substantially different results. To illustrate this, consider the small example depicted in Figure 43; this
instance has four nodes (0, 1, 2, and 3) and three edges ((0,1), (0,2), and (0,3)), a scenario that
specifically mimics the situation of a hotspot as such a cell is usually connected to two tour paths and
one link. Cells 0, 1, 2, and 3 have an elevation of 450m, 500m, 400m, and 400m, respectively, whereas
edges ((0,1), (0,2), and (0,3) have a length of 50m, 50m, and 70m, respectively. Moreover, it is assumed
that the employed UAV has a climb‐rate and dive‐rate that are equal to 1, a dB‐distance of 100m, and
OA limits of 50m and 1500m (Note: these input data are coded in AMPL and can be found in Section 4 of
the Appendix). Running the OAP model with different objective preference configurations gives the
results in Table 7.
To sum up, the first scenario favors a constant ASL operating altitude with no allowance. The
second preference yields variations in both the ASL and AGL altitudes with some stealth allowance. The
final configuration leads to a constant AGL operating altitude, a high allowance across all nodes, and
great variations in ASL altitudes. Because of this sensitivity to the objective weights, the surveillance
architect is advised to define the objective priorities well and evaluate few scenarios to internalize the
impact of his/her decisions.
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Table 7: Results of running the OAP model on the input data of the above example
yi
zi
Total Objective
Preference Node i
xi
0
600
150
0
wδ = 0.5
0
600
100
1
40
wx = 0.2
0
600
200
2
wz = 0.3
0
600
200
3
25
525
75
0
wδ = 0.5
50
550
50
1
60
wx = 0.4
0
500
100
2
wz = 0.1
0
500
100
3
50
500
50
0
wδ = 0.4;
50
550
50
1
65
wx = 0.5;
50
450
50
2
wz = 0.1;
50
450
50
3

5. Tour Segmentation
In the previous section, it is shown that a surveillance tour is algorithmically designed to visit all
reachable hotspots, and its associated trip cost is determined in terms of distance traveled.
Furthermore, efficient links from the outpost to the high‐risk cells (as shown in Figure 37) as well as their
associated energy consumption are also established. The only missing piece now is the verification of
the endurance constraint for the whole surveillance trip, as the traveling UAV might not be able to
traverse all the tour’s segments plus two complete links (for going back and forth from the outpost) with
one charged battery or fuel tank.
To address such an issue, a finishing algorithm is executed in order to reach one of the following
states:
1. Confirm that there exists at least one tour that starts from the outpost and feasibly visits all
hotspots before returning to the origin with enough energy reserve. (Note that if there is more
than one of such tours—depending on which two links are chosen—the least‐cost trip is
selected.)
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2. Segment the tour into a set of subtours that yield a feasible round trip. Note that this set has the
same cardinality as the set of hotspots to be visited. In other words, every high‐risk cell is
adopted as the start of a unique subtour (given that the UAV has just left the outpost), which is
then stored as an option for the later‐solved Set Covering Problem. This helps construct an
efficient combination of subtours performed by possibly different UAVs in order to optimize
certain objective measures, which are later discussed in the upcoming chapter.
This finishing algorithm can be described by the following steps (whose corresponding pseudo‐
code can be found in Section 5 of the Appendix). Furthermore, Figure 44 is presented to illustrate the
generated subtour’s state during a certain iteration.
(0) Obtain the list of hotspots to be visited in a sorted state according to the TSP sequence, and
establish an empty list of subtours that is returned as an output.
(1) If the hotspots list is empty, then go to step (6). Otherwise, select the cell that is on top of the
hotspots list, call it the start‐node, and proceed to step (2).
(2) Establish a new subtour that has two segments only: a link from the outpost to the start‐note,
and another link from the start‐node to the outpost. Note that this subtour is feasible
endurance‐wise because the start‐node has passed the reachability test (as discussed in Section
2 of this chapter).
(3) Perform an iterative loop of the following substeps until a break is reached:
a. Refer to the TSP sequence that starts with the start‐node.
b. Obtain the next hotspot on the list that has not been included in the established subtour. If
all hotspots are included in the subtour already, break out of the loop.
c. Compute the trip distance that would be traveled by the UAV if this next hotspot were to be
added to the subtour. This is accomplished by acquiring the total length of the subtour
(which includes the links), subtracting the length of the recently‐added link (also referred to
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as the current return path), and then adding the length of the new link (from the next
hotspot to the outpost) and the length of the new path (that connects the next hotspot to
the current subtour). To visualize this situation, see Figure 44 where the solid lines portray
the subtour’s trajectory while the dotted lines represent the yet‐to‐be included paths.
d. If this computed distance does not violate the endurance constraints, then discard the
current return path and add to the subtour the new path (to the next hotspot) and its
associated link. Otherwise, break out of the loop.
(4) Add the subtour to the subtours list.
(5) Remove the start‐node from the original list of hotspots, then go to step (1).
(6) If the subtours list contains at least one trip that comprises all hotspots, then return the least‐
cost trip alone. Otherwise, return the entire subtours list. Lastly, stop this procedure.

Figure 44: A snapshot during the process of expanding a subtour by the finishing algorithm
Note that each subtour ought to be associated with an approximated cycle‐time in order to
facilitate the resource allocation process (discussed in the next chapter). This parameter is obtained by
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summing up three distinct periods: (1) the downtime, which is spent readying the device through
performing maintenance and refueling the tank or replacing the battery; (2) the travel time, which is the
temporal interval required to traverse all edges in the subtour; and (3) the inspection time needed to
scan every hotspot (note: the scan of a specific high‐risk cell i by a an aerial vehicle u is assumed to be
performed in a serpentine flight pattern with a FOV of a diameter d(u,i); the computation process of the
traveled distance is demonstrated in Figure 45).

Figure 45: The computation process of the traveled distance for inspection (Dins)
Therefore, the following formula is utilized to compute the cycle time of a UAV u:
Tc(u) = tD(u) + ∑{e in edges} [L(e) / v(u)]

┌

┐

+ ∑{i in hotposts} [pscan . [ (scell / d(u,i)) . (scell + d(u,i)) ‐ d(u,i)] / v(u)]

where v(u) and tD(u) are the cruise velocity and downtime associated with UAV u, respectively.
Furthermore, L(e) is the length of edge e, and scell is the cell‐side’s length. Finally, consider pscan, the
proportion of the scanning effort, which is a measure introduced to provide flexibility in controlling the
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time spent inspecting. This parameter can also be utilized to adjust the time spent in inspection if a non‐
serpentine flight pattern is assumed. Note that the field of view diameter d(u,i) for a hotpot i that is
scanned by a UAV u is obtained through this formula:
d(u,i) = 2 . OA(u,i) . rDV(u) / r(u)
where OA(u,i) is the optimized operating altitude at which vehicle u flies over cell i, a measure acquired
through the method introduced in the previous section. Moreover, r(u) and rDV(u) are the slant‐range
and the FOV radius for vehicle detection of the sensor carried onboard UAV u, respectively.
To conclude, this chapter explains how endurance‐compliant 3D subtours are generated for
each tactical system. These subtours represent all the possible options to carry out the desired
surveillance in a feasible manner. The next chapter introduces a method to select the most efficient
portfolio of these options in order to define the final set of assets to be purchased, and hence, provide a
practical and cogent answer to the target investment question of this study.
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CHAPTER 6: SYSTEM ALLOCATION

In this chapter, resource allocation is performed in order to build a complete surveillance plan
and extract from it the manning and technological investments required to provide adequate protection
to a specific outpost. In the context of this study, investment decisions are reliant on a comprehensive
investigation that spans several attributes, factors, operations, and technological systems. So far, most
of the analysis has been centered around the use of tactical UAVs as their way of operating is by far the
most constrained, and is subsequently critical and necessary prior to making a decision. Nonetheless,
these vehicles are not the only popular systems in the market; strategic aerial vehicles and stationary
assets also play a role in providing advantages through their surveillance sensors. The procedure
adopted to achieve an investment choice varies significantly between these three kinds of technologies
due to several features.
First, tactical systems fly at low altitudes and have an accurate but small swath; this renders
them adequate for monitoring routes and trails as well as checking geographical spots and small regions.
In addition, they are vulnerable to obstructions and high‐wind levels. As a result, their potential flight
tours have to be evaluated. Strategic vehicles on the other hand operate from high altitudes. They are
much less vulnerable to obstructions and weather conditions, and their swath can cover substantially
large areas; as a result, their surveillance plan can be modeled as a surface area that is scanned with
scheduled flight patterns, as discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. Conversely, immobile assets provide
a stare‐mechanism that is persistence over time, and neither motion patterns nor revisit‐times are
needed to be analyzed. However, the number of required stationary assets may be large, and even
difficult to determine, as the sensors’ field of view might be much smaller than the area to be covered.
Furthermore, deploying several of them to achieve an adequate coverage depends on the ability to
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protect them (and hence, their required proximity to the base) as well as the availability of anchored
platforms and installation surfaces.
Another feature that causes a difference in technology evaluation is the refueling need. While
stationary systems are not subject to this constraint, mobile aircrafts have different ways of recovering
their endurance. To be more specific, tactical UAVs are organic (i.e. dedicated) to a specific outpost and
can be easily recovered and refueled/recharged upon arriving to their origin. Strategic assets on the
other hand must return to the main base (FOB), which ought to have a runway and is located tens, if not
hundreds, of kilometers away from the surveilled outpost. This leads to two important aspects, first of
which is associated with the fact that strategic systems do not compete for human resources with their
tactical and stationary counterparts. Furthermore, strategic aerial vehicles belong to the main base, but
they do surveil large areas surrounding several outposts. Therefore, such an asset can be considered a
shared resource, and this requires that several outposts are to be considered in the corresponding
resource allocation model in order to reach a valid investment conclusion.
To conclude, these main three types of technological assets should be treated separately and
differently in order to reach a valid and practical investment decision. The various factors behind such
an argument are summarized in Table 8. Nevertheless, regardless of the type of analysis involved, there
is a serious limitation that has to be considered for outpost surveillance missions, and that is the lack of
human resources during a certain operation period. This is due to the outpost’s nature of being small
and to the level of expertise the systems operator has to have. The manning requirement to carry out
such missions is one of the main concerns during planning, and is therefore treated as the objective of
the optimization model. The associated minimization is however performed in an implicit and natural
fashion through optimizing the number of utilized assets per kind, as explained in the later sections.
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Table 8: The factors involved in determining the appropriate analysis for a certain type of assets
Tactical
Stationary
Strategic
Operating altitude
Low
Low
High
Modeling structure Tour
Surface area
Surface area
Ownership type
Organic
Organic
Shared
Refueling
Needed
Not Needed
Needed
Service type
Intermittent
Persistent
Intermittent
Asset protection
Need for stealth Need for proximity to outpost
Not needed
Control personnel
Needed
Not needed
Needed

1. Tactical Systems

1.1. Building the Solution
At this stage, information about the UAVs’ subtours is available as explained in Chapter 5. For
the sake of easy clarification, consider that the data is organized in a column format of 0’s and 1’s so as
to facilitate its integration to an optimization model. In this matrix, the element aij equals to 1 when
subtour j visits node i, and 0 otherwise. If this numerical structure is fed to the classic Set Covering
Problem (see the model below, from Vaziran (2001, p. 108)), one can obtain a least‐cost solution—in
terms of traveled distance—that covers all the given hotspots.
S
E
cs
aes

set of subsets
set of elements
cost of selecting subset s
1 if subset s contains element e, and 0 otherwise

xs

1 if subset s is selected, and 0 otherwise

S.t.

Min ∑{s in S} cs . xs
∑{s in S} aes . xs = 1
xs in {0,1}

∀e in E
∀s in S

(1)
(2)

The advantage of this model is that it can incorporate several system brands (e.g. Raven,
Shadow, etc) in the solution at once, as opposed to solving the UAV‐subtour allocation problem one
brand at a time. To be more precise, each kind of vehicles is associated with a submatrix that comprises
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every way in which the asset can be employed. An example of five hotspots and three UAVs is depicted
in Figure 46.

Figure 46: Subtour input data to the Set Covering Problem
This scenario assumes that none of the UAVs has enough endurance to complete the entire tour. As a
result, there is at least one 0 in every column of the matrix. Also, notice that there are as many columns
(subtours) as hotspots for each vehicle, and that this number coincides with the number of options of
starting a subtour at a certain node.
The classic SCP model is however not directly applicable in the context of this study for two
main reasons. First, there is a need to consider the time aspect when choosing subtours and assigning
UAVs. In other words, the revisit‐frequency has to be adequate enough for each hotspot to mitigate the
risk associated with it. The revisit‐time constraint can then be integrated in this phase to ensure that τi
(the revisit‐time of hotspot i, which is introduced in Chapter 4) is met for all high‐risk cells. This issue
becomes even more complex when the aspect of parallelism is employed. That is, there might be the
case of being unable to satisfy this constraint for a certain subtour with one UAV. In this case, two or
more vehicles have to be operated concurrently with an adequate timeframe between their departure
times. As a result, the SCP is converted to a Time‐Based Set Covering Problem (TBSCP), which takes
advantage of the following formula that reflects concurrency:
1/Ttotal = ∑i(1/Ti)
where Ttotal is the cycle‐time that results from operating several systems concurrently, with each system i
having a cycle‐time of Ti (note that the cycle‐time in this context spans the flight period, the refuel or
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recharge time, and any periodic maintenance; as a result, the scheduling and refueling need constraints
are integrated just by using this formula). To illustrate this, consider two UAVs with a cycle‐time of 1
hour; if flown simultaneously and with an appropriate time gap between departure times, a hotspot can
be visited every 30 minutes (i.e. 1/(1/2) = 1 + 1). This leads to the second point of modifying the SCP,
which corresponds to the potential need to utilize two or more aerial vehicles of the same brand. This
can be accounted for by converting the decision binary variables to integers. The customized TBSCP can
then be formulated as follows, and its associated AMPL code is provided in Section 6 of the Appendix:
S
V
cj
fij
τi

set of (sub)tours
set of nodes
cost of selecting (sub)tour j
revisit‐frequency (by a certain UAV brand) if (sub)tour j contains node i, and 0 otherwise
required revisit‐time for node i

xj

needed number of trips for (sub)tour j

S.t.

Min ∑{j in S} cj . xj
∑{j in S} fij . xj = 1/τi
xj in {0,1}

∀i in V
∀j in S

(1)
(2)

1.2. Refining the Solution
The output solution of the TBSCP optimization model is a conservative one and can sometimes
be costly, as it assumes that the subtours have to be monitored by a set of tactical platforms and their
operators concurrently, which might be unnecessary. In order to avoid superfluous investments and
resource allocation, in both systems and personnel, an algorithm can be executed to verify if
independent subtours can be travelled in a sequential fashion; this becomes even more beneficial when
these subtours do not contain hotspots with short revisit‐times. To illustrate this point, consider the
example depicted in Figure 47; the optimal solution given by the TBSCP model requires four UAVs to
operate in parallel: one vehicle for subtour1, one vehicle for subtour2, and two vehicles for subtour3.
Also, notice that subtour3 contains a hotspot (in red) that requires a shorter revisit‐time due to its
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extreme high risk‐score; this is why this subtour demands the concurrent operations of two UAVs, and
as a result, it is left alone from further analysis. On the other hand, subtour1 and subtour2 may be able
to be operated by the same UAV if the sum of the associated cycle‐times (which include
recharging/refueling and maintenance) is less than the minimum revisit‐time across all the nodes in
these two subtours; the corresponding formula models such a condition:
Tsubtour1 + Tsubtour2 < min{i in subtour1 U subtour2}(τi)
If this condition is met, then the number of vehicles in the solution can be decreased from 4 to 3. The
issue with checking this condition is that it becomes cumbersome when there are several subtours that
can be joined. In fact, this turns out to be an optimization problem that targets assigning assets to
subtours in a way that minimizes investment costs while still satisfying the revisit‐frequency constraint.

Figure 47: A TBSCP solution in which one hotspot (in red) requires a high revisit‐frequency
This can be achieved through a variant of the Assignment Problem (AP), and sets of subtours can
be formed to be serviced by one dedicated UAV. Similarly to TBSCP, this assignment model needs to
satisfy the revisit‐frequency constraint, and hence, requires the integration of the time aspect. This is
accomplished via the following model, which solves the problem referred to in this context as the Time‐
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Based Vehicle Assignment Problem (TBVAP), and whose AMPL code can be found in in Section 7 of the
Appendix:
S
V
m
dij
τi

set of subtours
set of vehicles
a very large number (a.k.a. big‐m)
duration that vehicle i takes to traverse subtour j
required revisit‐time for subtour j

xij
yi

1 if vehicle i services subtour j, and 0 otherwise
1 if vehicle i is to be purchased, and 0 otherwise

S.t.

Min ∑{i in V} yi
∑{i in V} xij = 1
∑{j in S} dij . xij < min{j in S} τj
∑{j in S} xij < m . yi
xij in {0,1}
yi in {0,1}

∀j in S
∀i in V
∀i in V
∀i in V, ∀j in S
∀i in V

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Constraint (1) ensures that every subtour is serviced by one vehicle, whereas constraint (2)
forces the required revisit‐time to be met. Constraint (3) establishes the relationship between xij and yi
variables in such a way that if a certain UAV is not to be purchased, all the assignments associated with
it are void. The objective function targets the reduction of purchased assets. In this model, it is
important to note that:


The revisit‐time of a subtour is the minimum revisit‐time across all the nodes in that subtour.



Not all subtours qualify for such an analysis; they ought to have a revisit‐time that is high
enough to be monitored by one UAV at a time.



When a vehicle cannot service a subtour, it is assigned a traversal duration of m (big‐m, a very
large number) in order to force the resource to be an unattractive alternative for the model to
select.
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Swapping or reassigning UAVs of different brands to subtours (e.g. replacing UAV i of brand
Shadow with UAV k of brand ScanEagle for subtour j) in this model is always a safe transaction
as constraint (2) ensures that the newly assigned platform has enough endurance to service the
subtour.

Figure 48: An example of five subtours that are assigned five UAVs
To explain how this works through a concrete example, consider Figure 48. It depicts a TBSCP
solution where five subtours are assigned five vehicles whereby UAV1, UAV2, UAV3, UAV4, and UAV5
service their corresponding subtours in 1.25, 1.75, 1, 1.1, 0.75 hours, respectively. Again, the objective is
to decrease the number of resources to monitor the five paths if possible. Note that for simplicity, all
vehicles are assumed to have the same cruise velocity; and hence, the duration they spend to service a
certain subtour is the same. Furthermore, assume that all paths have the same revisit‐time—2.5 hours
in this case. The AMPL code for this example’s input data can be found in Section 7 of the Appendix.
The outcome of this instance is a solution that suggests employing three technological assets
rather than the original five, yielding a 40% reduction in the number of assets needed. Moreover, a
sensitivity analysis on the revisit‐time demonstrates this input parameter can significantly impact the
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output solution. In this example, a revisit‐time ranging from 1.95 hours to 6 hours leads to an
improvement from 20% to 80%, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis on the revisit‐time with the
reduction of needed assets as an outcome
Revisit‐time (hrs) Assets to be purchased Reduction
1.95
4
20%
2.5
3
40%
3
2
60%
6
1
80%
In conclusion, depending on the risk degree of the subtours’ nodes, the TBVAP optimization
model can greatly refine the tactical system allocation solution (by TBSCP) to a less costly one. However,
it is possible for this resource allocation mechanism to propose a solution that can be impractical with
respect to the needed personnel (e.g. ten operators to control five Shadows in an outpost of twenty
soldiers). For that, the option of reducing the manning requirement and its impact on the surveillance
plan are to be investigated. To be more specific, because less personnel means the ability to control less
assets, the process of flying aircrafts concurrently might have to become sequential at some degree; this
leads the revisit‐times to be higher. This tradeoff has therefore to be further studied and analyzed; this
can be accomplished through repetitive sensitivity analysis, or alternatively, by altering the model to a
surrogate that minimizes the revisit‐time subject to an asset purchase constraint. All in all, the resource
allocation solution that is obtained through this phase has to be evaluated to ensure practicality.

1.3. Scaling the Solution
The last remaining piece to attain a complete surveillance plan for tactical systems is to scale the
solution constructed in the previous section to a 24‐hour schedule. This is achieved by simply repeating
the subtour cycle for each vehicle throughout the entire day. The cycle‐time can also be increased with
more idle time in case the required revisit‐frequency is far from being reached. For instance, consider
the case in which the Shadow can perform a subtour cycle in 1.5 hour while the minimum revisit‐time is
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2.5 hours. The cycle‐time can be adjusted to 2 hours in order to minimize flight time that is deemed
unnecessary. Another adjustment that can be introduced during this final phase is customizing the cycle‐
times and flight times to the personnel’s availability as well as to the weather conditions. As an example,
the outpost might find night surveillance in the farther whereabouts not as important if the rough
terrain is believed to be highly unlikely to be crossed by insurgents during dark hours.

Figure 49: Process of building the surveillance plan for tactical systems
In this study however, it is assumed that the whole 24‐hour range is covered since the aim is to find a
good approximation for the required investment and resource allocation, as opposed to planning what
the outpost ought to exactly do. Given that, the manning requirement stays constant during the day,
and the measure is reported as an integer that reflects the required availability at each point of time
(e.g. 3 people means that at a certain time during the day, there has to be 3 personnel on duty, as
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opposed to 3 people per day). This way, flexibility is given to the decision maker to decide on the actual
number of people to be in the outpost.
All in all, this section presents another piece of the developed framework that incorporates the
constraints associated with scheduling, revisit‐frequency, and refueling or charging the battery, for the
tactical systems. This can be summarized in three main steps, which are depicted in Figure 49.

2. Stationary Systems
Stationary systems, mainly tower/wall cameras and aerostats, offer a convenient technological
means to monitor whereabouts with very short or no revisit time. Nonetheless, because of their
immobility, there are two aspects that have to be considered. Firstly, these assets have to be somehow
protected because of their inability of fleeing an attack scene. Subsequently, they have to be close to
the outpost if not inside it. Secondly, a digitization grid system is generally inappropriate for modeling
static surveillance coverage. This is due to the undesirable dependency on the cell size. To be more
specific, in such a paradigm, cells are assigned technological assets; while mobile platforms can flexibly
fly in certain patterns to cover part or all of the cell area, immobile systems are fixed to a specific
location, and their ability to cover this surface depends on the size of the grid cell. To further illustrate
this inconvenience, consider the example in Figure 50 where the digitization of the map results in four
cells representing the outpost. The first issue with this scenario is that the sensor range (assumed to be
circular) only covers a small portion of the cell. Assigning one sensor per cell would create major
vulnerabilities in surveilling the vicinity. Another problem is that the exact location of the sensor cannot
be determined because the details of the shape and borders of the COP/OP are hidden behind the cell
representation. Furthermore, this inconvenience and its resulting inaccuracy become more extreme as
the cell size becomes larger.
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Figure 50: A digitized map of an outpost where each grid cell is assigned a stationary sensor
This study therefore suggests another strategy that is independent of the grid structure, yet still
viewable in a map visualization interface. This idea is based on modeling the needed surveillance
coverage as a thick virtual wall (also referred to as the surveillance tape) around the outpost that acts as
an alarm zone between the inside and outside.

Figure 51: A way to envelop the irregular perimeter of the outpost with a surveillance tape
One of the benefits of using this structure is the elimination of the need to assume that COPs/OPs do
not have irregular shapes, a typical case when space is occupied by a human settlement. Another
advantage is the inherited satisfaction of the asset protection constraint—one of the main restraints
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considered in this study (as mentioned in Section 1 of Chapter 3). This upside is due to the nature of the
proposed strategy; in other words, the stationary assets are naturally located within the surveillance
tape, hence, positioned nearby the outpost and receiving adequate protection. Subsequently, such a
constraint does not have to be modeled or integrated in the solution process.
To achieve a surveillance tape structure, four pieces of information are required:
1. The height and width of the inner rectangle that either represents, or is inscribed by, the
perimeter of the outpost, as demonstrated in Figure 51.
2. The thickness of the virtual wall (i.e. the needed range of coverage), which in turn helps
determine the dimensions of the outer rectangle.
3. An allowance for lack of coverage, which helps avoid an investment that adds little value to an
almost complete coverage, as shown in Figure 52.
4. The coordinates (x,y) of the center of the inner rectangle (which happen to be the same for the
outer one as well).

Figure 52: A solution example with multiple sensor ranges and allowance for lack of coverage
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Once the virtual wall is established, the next step is to efficiently fill it with sensor ranges, as
shown in Figure 52, in order to effectively monitor this zone. The task of positioning sensors to attain
such a layout is adopted as an optimization problem, which from now on shall be referred to as the
Stationary System Positioning/Placement Problem (SSPP). In the rest of Section 2, reasonable
assumptions are established and justified in order to further simplify the structure of SSPP. Next follow
the description of a solution process that considers investment alternatives with and without the
aerostat system, the formulations of coverage contributions and overlaps, and a discussion about the
algorithms invoked to efficiently position the surveillance assets.

2.1. Problem Complexity
SSPP is a complex optimization problem in the sense that it targets covering a certain
percentage of the area of the thick virtual wall with the smallest possible number of sensors. To achieve
this aim, a reliable method to measure the effective (overlap‐free) coverage of a certain placement of
stationary assets has to be established so as to check if the surveillance demand is satisfied.
Furthermore, in addition to the nonlinear nature of the problem, there are about three more aspects
that add complexity to the problem.
Firstly, to solve SSPP, there is this required flexibility to position a tower‐camera in the east‐,
west‐, north‐, or south‐side of the virtual wall. Hence, there is this inevitable need for the logic‐or
operator that allows the solution algorithm to achieve such positioning. On the other hand, a pure
mathematical program assumes that all constraints are joined through a logic‐and operator, a fact that
renders this type of models lack the capability to solve SSPP. To overcome this intricacy, a fast
construction algorithm is designed to take advantage of the virtual wall’s four rectangular shapes (or
segments) to simplify the solution process (explained in the Section 2.4).
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Secondly, there is a delicacy in intelligently incorporating the aerostat and assessing its value
added. This is due to the fact that such devices have a high cost of operation, maintenance, and support
(OM&S) as well as several maintenance requirements, including manpower—an estimated cost of over
2.5 million dollars per year (Air Combat Command, 2007). This fact greatly limits the allocation of
aerostats to COPs/OPs. In this study, it is assumed that a maximum of one tethered platform can be
assigned to an outpost. This reasonable and practical restriction would also mean that the surveillance
device is most likely to be positioned in the center of the military settlement (and hence, at the centroid
of the virtual wall) in order to provide balanced coverage for all four segments. This established mindset
raises new concerns: first, what is the degree of overlap between the virtual wall and the aerostat? This
question is important as its answer affects the allocation of tower cameras. Another concern is related
to whether or not the tethered vehicle represents a justified investment, as a significant portion of its
coverage contribution lies within the outpost’s area, but outside of the zone of interest—the
surveillance tape. These aspects are addressed in Section 2.2.
Finally, there is the potential issue of having multiple kinds of mounted cameras. Such a
situation creates the need to consider field of views and coverage ranges that have different
dimensions; this renders the model more complex. On the other hand, there is considerable motivation
to restrict the solution to only one kind of surveillance cameras for each solution run. This approach is
associated with the fact that for central processing systems (of sensor output feeds), system
compatibility, purchase, and maintenance may be an issue once two or more sensor types are utilized.
Therefore, it is assumed that only one camera type is purchased in order to ease standardization,
integration, and upkeep. (Note: prior to specifying the sensor‐related parameters needed in this
analysis, the user of this framework has two alternatives for evaluating the several brands of these
mountable devices: (1) perform a pre‐analysis sensor comparison, probably based on range and
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resolution, and then select one candidate to be considered for procurement; or (2) run the actual
analysis that is developed by this study for every considered camera type.)

2.2. Solution Process
To resolve SSPP, certain steps have to be followed in order to solve the right optimization
problem at the right time. To be more specific, there is a need to know: (1) whether or not an aerostat is
part of the solution, and (2) if this system is to be utilized by the outpost, are mounted cameras required
to complement any uncovered surface of the virtual wall? As a result, a solution process is designed to
identify all possible alternatives and their associated optimization solution method.

Figure 53: Steps of the solution process to select the best stationary surveillance alternative
The process starts by evaluating two investment alternatives: one that is based strictly on
mounted cameras, and is referred to as A1; and one that includes one aerostat, and is referred to as A2.
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First, the surveillance plan for A1 is constructed by efficiently placing camera ranges all over the virtual
wall. This is achieved by using an ad hoc algorithm that is later discussed in details in Section 2.4. After
the sensors are in place and the layout is complete, A1 is ready to be evaluated by the decision maker, a
task that is most likely to involve cost analysis, and is therefore out of the scope of this study. Similarly,
A2’s plan is developed prior to its evaluation, but in a different way. To be more precise, the process of
constructing a layout for A2 leads the analytical procedure to branch out to three mutually exclusive
conditions. The first one is when the aerostat does not cover a significant portion of the virtual tape (set
in this study as <50%); in that case, the investment option of acquiring the aerial platform is not
justified, and thusly discarded. The second case is based on the situation where the aerostat covers all of
the virtual wall’s surface (and maybe much more); in such a state, the solution is complete and ready for
evaluation. Finally, there is the scenario where the LTA platform covers a fairly high percentage of the
tape (>50%), but still needs the help of tower/wall‐mounted sensors to cover the whole surface (with
some allowance). In this case, there is the complication of how to efficiently construct a hybrid plan for
A2 (i.e. spread the cameras in the surveillance tape in a way that avoids the kind of coverage overlap
that increases the cost of the solution without adding a considerable value). A high‐level perspective of
the solution process is depicted in Figure 53.
Note that as mentioned earlier, the evaluation and comparison of A1 and A2 are out of the
framework’s scope. The reason is that such analysis is expected to be intricate due to the existence of
several decision criteria, and hence, needs its own rigorous study. To illustrate such complexity, consider
expenditure, a measure that is affected by human resources, overhead cost, time value of money, and
maybe even uncertainty (for example, despite its high cost, an aerostat might become an attractive
option if the tape’s thickness is predicted to increase over time). Such analysis is highly recommended as
it results in plans and policies that are more financially sustainable over longer periods of time.
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2.3. Coverage and Overlap Computations
The key to solving SSPP is understanding, and well formulating, the coverage of the surveillance
systems, the resulting overlap amongst each other, the individual coverage contribution of each sensor,
and the final coverage contribution of the sensors combination with respect to the virtual wall. In the
next subsections, each of these items is discussed and an associated mathematical formulation is
provided.
2.3.1. Coverage
In this study, the range or coverage of a stationary system simply means the projection of the
sensor’s field of view on the grounds’ surface. As a result, the coverage area is a function of both the
distance between the sensor and the ground (a.k.a. slant‐range), and the alpha angle, as described in
Figure 13 and Section 3 of Chapter 3. Also, it is worth noting that for stationary assets, this piece of
information plays an important role in determining the sensor’s coverage contribution, as opposed to
mobile assets, which take advantage of motion to cover larger surfaces regardless of the size of their
fields of view.
On the other hand, an increase in the slant‐range distance and alpha angle, which leads to larger
coverage, also reduces the resolution of the captured image. To handle this tradeoff, the alpha angle is
set fixed to a specific value, whereas the projection area is evaluated at three different resolution levels
(and hence three different slant‐ranges): (1) the vehicle detection level, (2) the dismount detection level
(with a slant‐range four times smaller than that of level (1)), and (3) the dismount identification level
(with a slant range four times smaller than that of level (2)). That being said, the coverage of tower‐
cameras and aerostats are determined in the following manner:
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The aerostat is assumed to carry sensors with an alpha angle of 90 degrees. This fact makes the
FOV of the dominant sensor (which is most likely to be the AWAPSS‐IR) to have a projection
whose perimeter is a perfect circle. Assuming a FOV that is 120 degrees wide, the appropriate
coverage radius can be found by multiplying the slant‐range by Arctan(60°). The radius can be
set to rID to identify dismounts, to rDD to detect dismounts, or to rDV to detect vehicles, by
increasing or reducing the slant‐range accordingly (see Figure 54). Note: the AWAPSS‐IR typically
has the following numbers: rID = 250m, rDD = 1000m, rDV = 4000m (look up the vehicle detection
level slant‐range in Table 3).

Figure 54: The representation of the LTA’s sensor FOV for three different levels of surveillance


For tower‐cameras, the FOV concept is applied differently since the slant of the sensor—most
likely to be the Raven‐IR or a device with similar parameters—is set almost horizontally (i.e. the
alpha angle is very small). The FOV projection on the ground surface can be represented as a
long ellipse. Also, the cameras are assumed to have a panning capability of 360 degrees. As a
result, the ellipse is rotationally translated around the sensor’s location, creating a disk with a
small hole in the center due to the blind‐spot effect (see Figure 55). However, this blind‐spot is
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assumed to be very small, and is subsequently neglected. As a result, the coverage of mounted‐
cameras is also modeled as a disk.

Figure 55: The FOV representation for a tower camera at three different levels of surveillance
From another side, the three resolution levels should still be captured. The way this is achieved
is by determining the associated spaces where the detection and identification events can
happen reliably, and then project them on the ground surface as disks. The corresponding radii
(rID, rDD, and rDV) are estimated to equal their slant‐range counterpart as the slant is almost
parallel to the ground. Note: the Raven‐IR typically has the following numbers: rID = 40m, rDD =
160m, rDV = 640m.
Finally, for the sake of simplicity when positioning towers in the virtual wall, and in order to well
manage overlaps and coverage contributions, the FOV projection for mounted‐cameras is modeled as a
filled square rather than a disk. These squares are acquired by maximizing their dimensions while still
staying inside the circular shape, as shown in Figure 56. Notice that this is a conservative approach
because the sensor coverage is underestimated, and hence, the resulting surveillance plan is not prone
to vulnerabilities due to this simplification. Moreover, after efficiently placing the tower cameras, the
original shape of the coverage area is restored for more accurate reports and visualization.
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Figure 56: Triming the circular shape of the tower‐camera’s coverage to obtain a square

2.3.2. Overlap
In general, surface overlap refers to the occupation of the same area by two or more
geometrical shapes. In this context, there is an interest in two kinds of overlaps, one of them is desired,
and the other one is a bit fuzzy:


The first type (referred to as O1) is the intersection between the sensor’s FOV projection and
one of the four segments of the surveillance tape. This measure is also referred as the coverage
contribution (CC), as it determines (depending on the range size and location) the portion of a
sensor’s range that is actually meeting the demand for coverage, and hence effective to the
surveillance plan.

Figure 57: Three cases for positioning the squared shape and L‐shape and their levels for overlap
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This kind of overlap is desired, and therefore should be maximized (by efficiently utilizing the
target asset, as opposed to adding another sensor to attain maximal coverage; Figure 57 depicts
different levels of utilization efficiency).


The second type (O2) refers to the intersection between any two or more sensor coverage
contributions. This sort of overlap can be either desired or undesired, depending on the
situation: if more overlap means increased coverage redundancy (and hence, more security for
the outpost) without increasing the cost of the solution, then that is ideal; however, if O2
overlap is the result of positioning cameras inefficiently close to each other, requiring more
assets to cover the target area, then that is undesired. Yet, regardless of the degree of
desirability or undesirability, this measure has to be computed in order to calculate the
surveillance plan’s total CC without counting the overlaps twice.
It is worth emphasizing that to accurately compute the O2 overlaps, it is necessary to

understand that O2 formulations depend heavily on O1 formulas. To elaborate, the overlap of interest
between two sensor ranges is strictly the portion of their intersection area that is situated inside the
surveillance tape, and not simply their intersection area. As a result, the coverage contributions of the
two sensors have to first be obtained by acquiring their O1 overlap, and then the two CCs can be used to
determine the O2 overlap through their intersection. Figure 58 shows an example of two sensors i and j
covering a segment of the virtual wall; the illustration distinguishes the total overlap between the FOV
projections (with the darker blue fill), the coverage contributions (with shade lines; also surrounded by
dashed lines), and the undesired O2 overlap (with intersecting shade lines). Note that four pieces of data
are needed to compute the area of O2 overlaps, and they are the centroid’s (x,y) coordinates, width,
and height of O1 overlaps.
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Figure 58: Two overlapped sensor ranges positioned over a segment of the virtual wall
Another useful aspect is that since both the virtual wall’s segments and sensor ranges are
assumed to have a rectangular shape at this point, both kinds of overlaps (O1 and O2) yield simple area
computations (i.e. A = w . h, where w is the width and h is the height) as the intersection of two
rectangles is a rectangle. Nevertheless, there is some complexity in formulating the input parameters
themselves (w and h) since the dimensions of the virtual wall segments and the FOV projections can
hold any value in theory. In practice, the interval of input values is much more limited, yet it still
contains an unlimited set of numbers. Thus, the overlap formulation is constructed in a generic fashion
in order to account for the many input values, and specifically for the following scenarios:
(a) two rectangles, i and j, are far away from each other (not having any overlap)
(b) rectangle j is completely inside rectangle i
(c) rectangle j is partially inside rectangle i
(d) rectangles i and j cross each other with maximum overlap without one fitting inside the other
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(a)

(b)

(c)
(d)
Figure 59: The four scenarios of overlap with regards to the width wij and x‐coordinate xij
To formulate a two‐shape overlap regardless of its type (i.e. both O1’s and O2’s), let (xij,yij) be
the coordinates of the rectangular intersection of rectangles i and j, while wij and hij be its width and
height, respectively (and therefore Aij = wij . hij is the area of the overlap). To render the formulation
process easier, each of the aforementioned scenarios is applied on wij solely (and without losing any
generality), as hij can be attained with the same footsteps as wij. To proceed with a complete
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formulation, let i and j have widths wi and wj, heights hi and hj, x‐positions xi and xj, and y‐positions yi
and yj, respectively.
The dimensions:
First, consider wij, the width of the overlap; the four aforementioned scenarios are applied to wij
in the following manner (also depicted in Figure 59):
(a) When rectangles i and j are far apart, wij is zero:
wij = 0
(b) When rectangle j is inside rectangle i, wij is the width of j:
wij = wj
(c) When rectangle j is partially inside rectangle (with respect to the x‐axis), wij is the sum of the
half widths wi/2 and wj/2 minus dxij, the distance between the rectangles’ centroids (as long as
the subtraction is positive):
wij = max(0, wi/2 + wj/2 ‐ dxij) = max(0, wi/2 + wj/2 ‐ |xi ‐ xj|)
(d) When rectangles i and j cross each other with maximum overlap without one fitting inside the
other, wij is the minimum of the two widths:
wij = min(wi, wj)
Note that scenarios (a) and (b) are particular cases of scenarios (c) and (d), respectively. Therefore, the
final formulation, along with an adequate function name Fw(i,j), is:
wij = Fw(i,j) = min{wi, wj, max(0, wi/2 + wj/2 ‐ |xi ‐ xj|)}
Similarly, hij can be computed through the function Fh(i,j) as follows:
hij = Fh(i,j) = min{hi, hj, max(0, hi/2 + hj/2 ‐ |yi ‐ yj|)}
which leads to the following overlap area formulation:
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Aij = Fw(i,j) . Fh(i,j)
Aij = min{wi, wj, max(0, wi/2 + wj/2 ‐ |xi ‐ xj|)} . min{hi, hj, max(0, hi/2 + hj/2 ‐ |yi ‐ yj|)}
The Coordinates:
As for the formulation of the coordinates (xij,yij), the above four scenarios are evaluated, and the
process is simplified by first considering xij only (without loss of generality):
(a) When rectangles i and j are far apart, xij does not exist.
(b) When rectangle j is inside rectangle i, xij is the same as xj:
xij = xj
(c) When rectangle j is partially inside rectangle (with respect to the x‐axis), xij is the:
xij = xi + (wi/2 ‐ wij/2),

if xi < xj

xij = xi ‐ (wi/2 ‐ wij/2),

if xi > xj

(d) When rectangles i and j cross each other with maximum overlap without one fitting inside the
other, xij is the same as the x‐position of the rectangle with the smallest width:
xij = xi,

if wij = wj (i.e. wi < wj)

xij = xj,

if wij = wj (i.e. wi > wj)

Assuming there is an overlap between rectangles i and j (i.e. the condition xi ‐ xj < wi/2 + wj/2 is verified)
and that wij is computed (through the function Fw(i,j)), the x‐coordinate of the overlap, xij, can be
computed through the function Fx(i,j):

xij = Fx(i,j) =

xi
xj
xi + (wi/2 ‐ wij/2)
xi ‐ (wi/2 ‐ wij/2)

if wij = wi
if wij = wj
if xi < xj, wij ≠ wi, wij ≠ wj
if xi > xj, wij ≠ wi, wij ≠ wj

Similarly, the y‐coordinate yij can be obtained using the variables yi, hi, yj, hj, and hij via a function Fy(i,j).
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2.3.3. Coverage Contribution
In order to be able to construct or search for a good solution for SSPP, a well‐established
coverage measure is necessary. In this context, the objective is to attain an efficient surveillance
coverage setup of stationary assets for the outpost. Therefore, the previously developed overlap
formulations are employed as a foundation to construct a formula that computes how much coverage a
certain layout of sensor ranges yields. In order to achieve this, four steps are followed: (1) establishing
assumptions and defining the variables, (2) formulating the coverage contribution of a sensor, (3) stating
the overlap formula between two sensors, and (4) presenting the total surveillance coverage equation.
First, assume that the 2D space to be covered, A, has a rectangular shape (as opposed to the
virtual wall’s shape, which is empty from the inside) where the top left corner is the origin of the frame
(0,0). This assumption is later scaled to meet the coverage demand of the surveillance tape. Let W be
the width of this rectangle, and H its height. Also, for any sensor i (with a square shape), let si = s be its
side’s length, xi its x‐coordinate, and yi its y‐coordinate. Furthermore, let Ci be the sensor’s coverage
contribution (i.e. its FOV’s intersection with the space A), and Cwi, Chi, (Cxi,Cyi) be its width, height, and
coordinates, respectively. Finally, let Oij be the O2 overlap between sensor i and j (i.e. the intersection of
their coverage contributions) with Owij and Ohij as its width and height, respectively.
Second, consider the following process to calculate the CC parameters by employing the
appropriate functions and formulas developed in the previous section:
Cxi = Fx(i,A)
Cyi = Fy(i,A)
Cwi = Fw(i,A) = min{W, s, max(0, W/2 + s/2 ‐ |W/2 ‐ xi|)}
Chi = Fh(i,A) = min{H, s, max(0, H/2 + s/2 ‐ |H/2 – yi|)}
Ci = Cwi . Chi
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Third, obtain the O2 overlap between any two sensors i and j:
Owij = min{Cwi, Cwj, max(0, Cwi/2 + Cwj/2 ‐ |Cxi ‐ Cxj|)}
Ohij = min{Chi, Chj, max(0, Chi/2 + Chj/2 ‐ |Cyi ‐ Cyj|)}
Oij = Owij . Ohij
Fourth, assuming there are N sensors during a certain evaluation run, calculate the overall CC of
the surveillance plan (CCT) by subtracting OT, the summation of overlaps between every two sensors (if
they are not far apart), from CT, the sum of all the sensors’ coverage contributions:
OT = ½ . ∑{i in 1..N, j in 1..N, i ≠ j, |xi ‐ xj| < (wi + wj)/2} Oij
CT = ∑{i in 1..N } Ci
CCT = CT ‐ OT
Notes:


Because the overlap between two sensors is counted twice in the OT summation—once for Oij
and another time for Oji, this summation is divided by 2.



This equation assumes that no aerostat is utilized.

2.4. Sensor Placement
The task of efficiently placing the squared (reduced) FOV projections (with a side length s) on
the virtual wall can be a challenging task. It can however be simplified by separating the tape into four
segments and filling each one separately. Since each of these segments has a rectangular shape, it
adheres to the assumption established in the previous section, and hence qualifies for the developed
overlap and coverage contribution computations. On the other hand, these four parts overlap at the
corners, and so the asset positioning algorithm has to avoid allocating duplicates for the same spot.
To understand how the SSPP solver works, first assume that the side length of a sensor’s range is
larger or equal to the thickness of the virtual wall. Because a corner of the surveillance tape is where the
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two segments meet, placing a sensor there yields the best use of the asset, as the sensor range leads to
the highest O1 overlap possible (as depicted in Figure 57). Therefore, the algorithm starts by placing four
assets in the four corners of the tape. The second step is to compute the CCT measure for each segment
and check whether or not the following condition holds, whereby Asegment is the area of the segment and
a is the allowance for lack of coverage:
CCT > Asegment . (1 ‐ a)
If this condition is verified, the segment is finalized—by stopping the associated iteration as well as
recovering the original circular shape of the FOV projections. Figure 60 for instance shows a virtual wall
with four segments that meet the coverage demand, and are therefore finalized.

Figure 60: A solution for a SSPP instance where four sensors suffice to provide apt coverage
If the condition is not verified, that means that the amount of uncovered surface [Asegment . (1 ‐ a)
‐ CCT] is positive and that more coverage is needed; and to increase it, the algorithm determines the N
new assets that are to be added to the segment (whose width W is larger than its height H, without loss
of generality) by computing:
N = [Asegment . (1 ‐ a) ‐ CCT] / (min(H, s) . s)
Note that the amount (min(H, s) . s) is the maximum coverage that a sensor can contribute.
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The process then continues by filling the uncovered surface by positioning the centroids of the
newly added camera ranges on the line that passes through the centroids of the corner sensors’ ranges
(referred to as the centroids line) such that the adjacent ones are equidistant from one another, like
shown in Figure 61.

Figure 61: A solution for a SSPP instance where a layer of FOVs suffices to provide apt coverage

Figure 62: A solution for a SSPP instance where two layers of FOVs are needed for apt coverage
Now, consider the case where the thickness of the surveillance tape is larger than the side
length of the sensor’s range. In such a setting, if the coverage demand (after incorporating the
allowance) is not met, then the virtual wall is divided into a set of layers that have the same thickness.
Given this division, each layer can be considered as a mini virtual wall. Subsequently, the above
described algorithm can be applied to each layer separately to acquire the set of ranges whose centroids
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are all aligned in each segment (see example in Figure 62). Note that there may be some overlap
between FOV projections that belong to different layers.
Let M be the minimum number of layers required to meet the coverage demand. By holding
true the previously established assumption W > H, M is acquired by dividing H, the height of the
segment (which is the same as T, the thickness of the virtual wall) by s, the length of the sensor’s range
side:
M=H/s=T/s
Notice that the quotient of the division can contain a fraction whereas M needs to be an integer. In that
case, the floor of the number is used first; if it does not meet the coverage demand, then it is replaced
by the ceiling.
Finally, the holistic algorithm that positions the sensors in the virtual wall, and consequently
reveals the number of assets needed for the A1 investment alternative, can be compiled in a concise
way through the following steps (and whose corresponding pseudo‐code can be found in Section 8 of
the Appendix):
(0) Obtain the length of the sensor’s range (s) and the virtual wall’s established parameters—the
width (W) and height (H) of the outer rectangle, the coordinates (x,y) of its center, the
allowance (a) for lack of coverage, and the thickness (T) of the tape (which is used as the width
or height for the four segments of the surveillance tape).
(1) Assign M the floor of the division T/s. If this calculation gives 0 as a result, assign M a value of 1.
(2) Divide the virtual wall into M layers. Note that it is possible to have one layer only.
(3) For each of the M layers, perform the following substeps:
a. Place a sensor at each corner in a way that maximizes O1 overlaps.
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b. For each of the four mini‐segments of the layer, compute the total coverage contribution
CCT (as instructed in Section 2.3.3), and check if the coverage demand is met (i.e. verify the
condition CCT > Asegment . (1 ‐ a)).
c. For each of these mini‐segments that have insufficient coverage, place N additional sensors
equidistantly along the centroids line. N is computed as instructed above.
(4) If the overall coverage demand is met, finalize the constructed layout and return it as output.
Otherwise, assign M the ceiling of the division T/s and re‐execute the steps (2)‐(4).

2.5. Sensor Placement with Aerostat
Assume that the A2 investment alternative is justified, and that it requires the use of mounted
sensors to complete the coverage for the surveillance tape. The approach taken to build a hybrid
surveillance system that comprises one aerostat and a set of wall/tower cameras can be divided to three
steps:
(1) As described in the previous section, build a layout solution for investment alternative A1 (which
contains only mounted cameras).
(2) Position the tethered platform such that the center of its range coincides with the centroid of
the virtual wall. Note that unlike the first step, the sensors ranges are not modeled as squares
due to the large scale of the aerostat’s FOV projection (i.e. each one of the four trimmed parts
of the disk that lead to a squared shape, as shown in Figure 56, may contain several camera
ranges in the aerostat’s case, which is inappropriate to ignore).
(3) Remove the cameras whose coverage is deemed unnecessary, i.e. whose overlap with the
aerostat’s range is significant. An example of such a situation is depicted in Figure 63. While this
step can be carried out manually using best ocular judgment, a more advanced method is

115

introduced below so that the solution can be implemented programmatically and hence, can
offer a scalable way to address a large number of surveillance assets.

Figure 63: The transition from a solution for A1 to a solution for A2

Figure 64: The geometric situation of two overlapping circular ranges with r1 and r2 as radii
To comprehend this method, consider two circular sensor ranges that overlap, as depicted in
Figure 64. The line that passes through their centers intersects with their overlap in a segment whose
length shall be called do. do can be obtained by subtracting d, the distance between the two ranges’
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centers, from (r1 + r2), the sum of their radii. Note that do is positively correlated with the intersection
between the sensors and can therefore be employed as a means to determine whether or not the
amount of overlap is considerable. To be more specific, if do is larger than a certain threshold (k . r2)—
where k can be specified as an input to this framework, but would have a default value of 90%—then
the intersection area between the FOV projections is regarded as significant. If such a situation is
identified when evaluating the overlap between the aerostat’s range and the mounted‐camera’s, the
latter asset is removed from the hybrid surveillance system. This approach is iterated through for each
mounted sensor until the coverage provided by investment alternative A2 is optimized.

3. Strategic Systems
Due to the high cost of purchase, maintenance, and manning of strategic systems, the efficient
use of these resources requires timesharing them amongst outposts, bases, and named areas of interest
(NAIs). Thus, in order to make a decision about the portfolio of assets to purchase, certain aspects have
to be considered at a larger scope (i.e. region‐based, as opposed to outpost‐based). In this section, a
different modeling notion is presented, its constraints are discussed, and their impact on the scope of
this study is explained.
The surveillance coverage model of this section is based on the nature of strategic vehicles. They
operate from high altitudes, they are much less vulnerable to obstructions and weather conditions, and
their swath can cover large areas (e.g. AWAPSS can provide a FOV projection of 8x8km2). Consequently,
their utilization can be carried out in a comprehensive fashion by scanning an entire region (as opposed
to visiting specific routes or spots only), which would strategically comprise several OPs, COPs, NAIs, and
one or more FOBs. As a result, activities and changes on the geo‐surface can be monitored in a way that
allows outposts and their backups to be alerted when the threat is still at a great distance from its
destination. This mindset leads to modeling the coverage of strategic systems as a surface area—
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referred to as a search‐box, usually a rectangle or a circle—that is much larger than the FOV projection
of the sensors carried onboard. Moreover, the search‐box concept also comes with the flight patterns
element that is concerned with the efficient fulfillment of the comprehensive scan; see Figure 65 and
Figure 66 for illustration. This paradigm can also be extended to watch over a set of search‐boxes.

Figure 65: A circular surface area with a spiral
flight pattern

Figure 66: A rectangular surface area with a
serpentine flight patterns

This search‐box notion seems to provide a model to solve the strategic surveillance problem
with more flexibility as some of the restrictions are not applied (e.g. payload limits, communication
ranges, wind resistance, terrain elevation, need for stealth or protection). Nonetheless, this model does
submit to certain restraints and performance measures that notably influence the process of finding an
adequate procurement solution. First, during the cyclical tours of a large platform, the source and
destination at the start and end of each surveillance cycle ought to have a runway as well as special
accommodations, equipment, and manpower to perform maintenance and refueling; such places are
most likely to be FOBs. Second, due to the vastness of the area scanned, and hence, the long distance
traveled, the endurance of the aerial vehicle has to be considered when designing the flight pattern. In
particular, the higher the endurance is, the longer the tours can be before returning to the origin in
order to refuel. Third, a combination of the following three parameters helps determine how fast a
certain region can be scanned: (1) the image resolution of the onboard sensors, as this defines the
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maximum altitude that enables accurate data collection; (2) the operating altitude—which should be
held constant as much as possible so as to minimize fuel consumption—as this determines the FOV
projection of the sensor, and as a result, the area covered at a certain point in time; (3) the cruise
velocity, which ought to be slow enough to allow accurate terrain scanning. Finally, the intermittence in
service requires a robust schedule so that the revisit‐time for each region does not create an
opportunity for the threat to traverse the monitored terrain unnoticed. The issue here, as mentioned in
Chapter 4, is that revisit times depend on the risk level of the target area. (Note that although it may be
measured differently, the aspect of risk in this context still pertains to the potential of insurgents’
presence; on the other hand, risky regions are different from hotspots, mainly due to the difference in
surface size.)

Figure 67: A surveillance plan for ten regions serviced by three strategic vehicles
Riskier regions would have to be scanned more often, which would require adjusting the flight patterns
to achieve redundant subtours for riskier search‐boxes or adding more assets to the portfolio to lessen
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the service intermittence. Figure 67 for instance shows a map with ten risky regions, one of which is
high‐risk and another with a moderate risk level; the surveillance plan is designed so that the high‐risk
search‐box is visited three times and the moderate‐risk one is visited twice in each cycle. In this
example, the plan takes advantage of three neighboring FOBs to achieve redundancy through shared
resources, as opposed to employing the same asset to service the same (high‐ or moderate‐risk) search‐
box more than once in the same cycle, and subsequently, increasing the revisit‐time for other regions.
From this preliminary analysis, it is apparent that constructing a coverage plan for large‐scope
surveillance—i.e. monitoring the vast regions around a set of outposts—requires a considerably
different kind of analysis than the (micro‐level) ones performed in the previous sections; it requires a
macro‐level analysis.
This macro‐level analysis also necessitates the evaluation of input data whose scale is beyond
the data provided for a specific outpost. To elaborate, risk has to be evaluated from a strategic
perspective, not a tactical one. Also, the size and shape of the search‐boxes have to be designed in a
way that accounts for the geo‐locations of the places needing protection, the distance traveled and
endurance requirements, historical attacks and battles, proximity to other bases or outposts that have a
runway, and some other factors mentioned in Chapter 4 such as trafficability and population. Next, the
sequence of visits for each search‐box (including redundancy if necessary) has to be determined before
constructing an efficient flight patterns that starts and ends at the adequate origin. Furthermore, if the
number of assets assigned to the set of target regions does not provide the desired revisit‐time, the
macro‐level analysis might have to be reiterated through with a larger set of resources until the desired
level of revisit‐frequency is achieved. Because of the difference in scale and complexity between the
macro‐ and micro‐level analyses, the allocation of strategic systems and their associated purchase
recommendations are considered out of the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY

At this point, the target analytical framework is fully introduced and thoroughly explained. The
next step is to apply it on a real‐life scenario in order to validate its output solution as well as showcase
its powerful utility. The chosen study case is COP Kahler, the outpost that sustained heavy damage
during the Battle of Wanat, a conflict started by an attack by approximately 200 insurgents on July 13th,
2008. A summary of facts is extracted from Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008, a report
released by The Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute (SUSACS) in 2010. Next, gleaned
information and provided data about the Wanat region are inserted and run in the analytical engine,
and the output of each phase in the analysis is exposed and adequately discussed. Last but not least,
conclusions about the recommended surveillance plan are concisely conveyed.

1. Background
COP Kahler was founded on July 8th 2008 in the village of Wanat, near the Waygal river, in order
to establish stability and allow the Coalition Forces to improve their relationship with the local
inhabitants. This establishment was also a way to relocate the forces from COP Bella, which was situated
in a region considered hostile after July 4th, where an attack from the Anti‐Afghan Forces (AAF) was
expected. This relocation mission was called ROCK MOVE, and was performed under high time pressure,
which led to a lack of settlement preparations in Wanat. COP Kahler comprised a total of 72 soldiers, 48
of which were Americans, and the rest were part of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The group was
very well equipped with weapons and firepower. They also set an observation post—named OP
Topside—about 75 meters from the COP command post (approximately 50 meters from the COP’s
perimeter) on a ridge in the eastern side. The combat outpost was about 110x50 meters squared, at an
elevation around 3350 feet, and adjacent to the village’s mosque, hotel/restaurant, and bazaar as
shown in the proposed outpost layout depicted in Figure 68.
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Figure 68: The proposed layout of COP Kalher
Source: SUSACS (2010)
The stone walls as well as other parts of the proposal were however not yet implemented before the
insurgents’ attack due to the early displacement of the forces, as well as the arrival latency of the
contracted builders. This was one of the main factors that contributed towards the COP’s vulnerability.
Furthermore, there were three other factors that gave the adversary a great advantage. Firstly, the
insurgents were able to infiltrate the village as civilians and collect intelligence about the outpost,
although some of the villagers approached the COP forces and warned them about an imminent attack.
Secondly, there was a severe lack of water, whereas the heat during the daytime was high; this crippled
any labor efforts towards building protective obstacles. Lastly, the outpost was located in a low‐level
geo‐platform that was surrounded by higher grounds and ridges (see Figure 69). Due to this setting, as
well as the presence of long trees, visibility was obstructed even for OP Topside, a fact that greatly
limited the situational awareness of the soldiers.
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Figure 69: A view of the Wanat village from the north
Source of original picture (without the labeled white overlays): SUSACS (2010)
On the other hand, the outpost did have some access to ISR assets, but it was either insufficient
or utilized ineffectively. To be more specific, Combined Joint Task Force CJTF‐101 did not provide ROCK
MOVE with the few agreed upon FMV (by the Predator) and SIGINT hours due to reduction in service
and relocation of assets to serve higher priority areas such as the Tangi Valley. Moreover, TF Bayonet
from the nearby FOB did not send their Shadow and Hunter UAVs to Wanat because of the rugged
nature of the Waygal Valley, which was believed to block the radio signals responsible for controlling the
aerial vehicles. Also, the personnel at Kahler were not assigned any organic UAVs—not even the highly
portable Raven—because it was believed that the hassle of employing the device—which was
vulnerable to crosswinds and blocked signals—as well as the trouble associated with finding it and
repairing it if lost during a flight mission were not worthwhile. Finally, there was the discouraging aspect
associated with the intimidating difficulty of finding insurgents using a small UAV in a large area of
mountainous and forested terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Gervais described it as “looking through a
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soda straw… it’s hit or miss” (SUSACS, 2010). This lack of long‐distance surveillance service impaired the
COP’s ability to attain appropriate situational awareness and debilitated their readiness for insurgents’
attacks. The Battle of Wanat eventually ended with 9 dead and 31 wounded from the coalition forces
side, and that is with the reinforcements they received an hour after the conflict started. The backup
support was powerful and effective, and ultimately forced the insurgents to withdraw.

2. Analysis
By contemplating the different facts of this event, valuable inferences can be derived and
adopted as the foundation of this case study. First, there was no utilization of organic UAVs due to the
inconvenience of their employment. There was also a dangerously exceeding reliance on shared non‐
organic resources whose service was not only short and intermittent, but also uncertain due to rising
emergencies in neighboring regions. Furthermore, even if there was a detection of a potential threat by
an ISR/FMV asset, there was little or no chance of performing cross‐cueing for identification purposes.
The analytical framework developed in this study could have helped reduce the reliance on non‐organic
assets by promoting the efficient utilization of small UAVs in two ways: (1) omitting the risk of losing the
aerial vehicle due to crosswinds or lack of electromagnetic signals by specifying feasible paths using
constraint analysis; and (2) mitigating the soda straw problem (i.e. finding threats by scanning large
areas using a small FOV) by drastically narrowing the search to a select of hotspots.
Second, the way that the approximately 200 insurgents snuck into the whereabouts of the COP
with their heavy ammunition shows their shrewdness and mastery of exploiting environmental aspects.
Even with a mediocre situational awareness, it would be hard not to notice the approach of such a large
number of well‐equipped individuals (relatively to the village population size). This is one more reason
why surveillance has to be conducted intelligently rather than exhaustively. In this case, the analytical
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tool could have assisted with rendering this practice possible by evaluating the terrain characteristics
and providing the list of places where the adversary was likely to pass by (i.e. hotspots).
Third, the Battle of Wanat was harsh on the coalition forces during the first hour when the
number of soldiers was much smaller than the opponent’s. Once the reinforcements arrived, the drift of
the conflict changed to the disadvantage of the AAF. This means that if the insurgents’ presence was
detected one hour before the attack begun, there would have been high chances of omitting this first
hour of intense hostility, if not eliminating the attack itself (by keeping the adversary from reaching the
outpost). Note that on a rough low‐trafficability terrain—which is the case for the Wanat region, it is
assumed that dismounts need 30 minutes to cross one kilometer. It is also assumed that the insurgents
need about one hour to position themselves, set up their gears and weapons, and communicate any
last‐minute tactics among each other before the attack starts. Hence, detection and identification has to
occur at most one hour after the adversary penetrates the two‐kilometer radius from the COP.

2.1. Input Data
This analysis targets the 5x5 km2 region that surrounds the Wanat village. The terrain is digitized
into a 50x50 grid thanks to the accuracy level of the provided input data. The COP, OP, and village are
assumed to be in cells (26,19), (26,20), (27,19), and (27,20), which are highlighted in green in Figure 70.
The given input data is under the format of 50x50 matrices where each matrix represents a specific
characteristic of the geological environment. The set of these characteristics includes the average,
maximum, and minimum terrain altitudes in ASL meters (see Figure 71 for data visualization). The data
also comprises the average slope (in degrees) and wind‐level (in m/s) matrices, both of which are
visualized in Figure 72 and Figure 73, respectively. Furthermore, each cell in the grid is bestowed upon
three binary specifications: (1) whether or not it belongs to the outpost, (2) whether or not it has an
anchor for the aerostat, and (3) and whether or not it has a base for tower cameras. In this case, the
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only cells that are assumed to have tower and aerostat anchors are ones that belong to the outpost. As
for population data, the only reported inhabitant concentration is in the Wanat village, which is
considered in this study to be part of the COP for two main reasons: (1) the villagers need protection as
the village has the potential to turn into a battle field, and (2) if insurgents infiltrate the village, it
becomes extremely challenging to rid of them.

Figure 70: The 50x50 Digitized terrain of the Wanat region
Note that trafficability data is not given, so it is assumed that all cells have poor trafficability t=1
(i.e. there is no unfair advantage or disadvantage amidst the grid cells). The foliage data is also not
given, but it is well known that the area around Wanat has a decent amount of foliage. Hence, the
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foliage attribute for each cell is randomly generated via the uniform distribution function whose range is
[1.5,2.5]. The only exception to this number generation process is the outpost cells, which are given a
foliage score of 1, because the village and the COP have a fairly cleared surface that comprises buildings
and a terrace, as can be seen from Figure 69.

Figure 71: Visualization of average altitude data (m)

Figure 72: Visualization of slope data (deg)

Figure 73: Visualization of wind‐levels data (m/s)
For non‐matrix parameters, consider the following aforementioned measures along with their
values and the risk factor to which they contribute:
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Table 10: Parameter values for the Wanat case study
Parameter

Symbol

Risk‐Factor

fmax
ho
hmax
R
βo
βmax
βmin
n/a

Foliage camouflage
Long‐range attacks
Long‐range attacks
Long‐range attacks
Accessibility to regions
Accessibility to regions
Accessibility to regions
Accessibility to regions

Maximum foliage
Ideal elevation for attack
Maximum effective elevation
Weapon’s maximum range
Minimum slope that hinders displacement
Maximum slope that hinders displacement
Slope threshold to consider trafficability
Trafficability range

Value
3
150m
300m
3000m
45deg
60deg
30deg
[0,2]

As for the platforms and sensors, the data set used is the same one given in Chapter 2 Section 1.

2.2. Terrain Risk Assessment
The given data is fed into the analytical framework and the terrain risk assessment phase is
performed as explained in the Chapter 4. As a result, the risk‐factors are generated under a format of
matrices; see their associated data visualization in Figure 74 through Figure 77.

Figure 75: Visualization of the risk‐factor
associated with proximity to population

Figure 74: Visualization of the risk‐factor
associated with foliage camouflage
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Figure 76: Visualization of the risk‐factor
associated with long‐range attacks

Figure 77: Visualization of the risk‐factor
associated with accessibility to regions

The framework can also incorporate a fifth optional matrix, as noted in Figure 31, based on
another element—the experts input, which is mostly based on historical data and experience in the
field. This addition is mainly to adjust the final composite map in case the terrain evaluation process
does not capture a subset of the cells that the analyst believes have a high potential for insurgents’
presence. In this case study, no such data is provided, and this fifth element is disregarded.
The next item to address is the generation of the composite map and the identification of
hotspots. Such a task depends on: (1) the weights associated with each risk‐factor—and in this case,
three profiles are explored; and (2) the selection process of high‐risk cells, whose analysis is a threshold‐
based one. The first profile assumes no difference in importance between the risk‐factors; hence all four
of them have a weight of 0.25. The second profile targets places from which long‐range attacks can be
launched; subsequently, emphasis is placed primarily on the LRA risk‐factor (with a weight of 0.5) and
secondarily on the accessibility factor (with a weight of 0.25) since the LRA hotspots need to be reached
punctually. The third profile focuses on the early stealthy movement of the adversary to reach the
outpost and key positions in a smooth and unpredictable fashion. The aspect for earliness in this context
is essential as the surveillance aims at detecting the threat as soon as possible. This is modeled by
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assigning 50% of the weight to the accessibility risk‐factor, 25% to the LRA factor, and 12.5% to both the
foliage camouflage and proximity to population factors. Notice that the foliage camouflage risk‐factor is
deemphasized in this profile despite its potential contribution to the stealthy displacement of
insurgents. This is due to the fact that the
corresponding matrix risk‐scores become greater
when the proximity to the outpost increases (as
seen in Figure 74), diluting by that the earliness
effect. For this same reason, a profile where
proximity to population is stressed is not
explored. The composite maps for these three
profiles are depicted in Figure 78 through Figure
Figure 78: Profile 1’s composite map
80.

Figure 79: Profile 2’s composite map

Figure 80: Profile 3’s composite map
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Profile 1: (wFC, wPTP, wLRA, wA, wEI) = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0)
Description: this profile is unbiased; i.e. it does not discriminate amongst the risk‐factors.

Figure 81: Light surveillance with
risk>0.6 yields 57 hotspots

Figure 82: Moderate surveillance
with risk>0.55 yields 99 hotspots

Figure 83: Heavy surveillance
with risk>0.5 yields 195 hotspots

Profile 2: (wFC, wPTP, wLRA, wA, wEI) = (0.125, 0.125, 0.5, 0.25, 0)
Description: this profile targets places from which long‐range attacks can be launched.

Figure 84: Light surveillance
with risk>0.6 yields 68 hotspots

Figure 85: Moderate surveillance
with risk>0.55 yields 107 hotspots

Figure 86: Heavy surveillance
with risk>0.5 yields 150 hotspots

Profile 3: (wFC, wPTP, wLRA, wA, wEI) = (0.125, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0)
Description: this profile targets locations that are unpredictable and lead to strategic positions.

Figure 87: Light surveillance with
risk>0.7 yields 72 hotspots

Figure 88: Moderate surveillance
with risk>0.65 yields 99 hotspots
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Figure 89: Heavy surveillance
with risk>0.6 yields 242 hotspots

As for identifying hotspots, the process is performed by verifying if the final risk‐score of each
cell—which is a number that belongs to the range [0,1]—is higher than a certain threshold. This
selection criterion is relative to the number of identified high‐rick cells at a certain level of ISR. To be
more specific, three levels of surveillance are considered:


Light: this level corresponds to any threshold that yields a number of hotspots that ranges from
1 to 75.



Moderate: this level corresponds to any threshold that yields a number of hotspots that ranges
from 76 to 125.



Heavy: this level corresponds to any threshold that yields a number of hotspots that is greater
than 125.

Note: in this study, extra effort is spent to make the second threshold as the mid‐point between the
other two in order to make the generation of these values more systematic.
Finally, the high‐risk cells identification is carried out for all nine combinations, and its outcome
is revealed in Figure 81 through Figure 89. The visualization of hotspots on the map helps evaluate the
potential presence of threats across the terrain as well as probe the output of the analytical tool. In this
case, it is known that the insurgents approached the Wanat village from the west, a fact that prompts
the analyst to favor the first and third profiles as Figure 83 and Figure 89 show high concentration of
high‐risk cells in the western side.
In the rest of this chapter, the heavy‐surveillance level of the first profile is chosen for the
deeper investigation associated with tour generation and resource allocation due to its larger scale and
its more balanced hotspots distribution across all four directions.
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2.3. Tour Generation
The tour generation analysis is performed on three UAVs: (1) the Raven (see Figure 90), (2) the
shadow (see Figure 93), and the ScanEagle (see Figure 96). Note that because each of these platforms
has different capabilities, the feasible space reached by each one is different. This is depicted by a net of
thin black lines that represent the UAV‐traversable edges, as shown in Figure 91, Figure 94, and Figure
97.
The 3D aspect is portrayed through plotting the optimized operating altitude (also referred to as
ASLOA) along with the above‐see‐level elevation (ASLE), as demonstrated in Figure 92, Figure 95, and
Figure 98. The optimization of such altitude is based on giving higher priority to image quality and
change in flight altitude over stealth through the weights 0.4, 0.4, and 0.2, respectively. The rationale
behind such a decision is the fact that good resolution is critical to detecting and identifying the
adversary, and that this task has to be carried out in an easy‐to‐use and energy‐efficient fashion
whenever possible. Note that under this configuration, the optimization model is expected to provide a
solution in which the UAV tries to stay as close to the ground as possible in order to collect best quality
images. The figures below show results that are consistent with this fact. The illustrations are also
accompanied by the framework’s output data so as to better convey how the flight tours are carried out
and show how the three platforms differ in operations.
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2.3.1. Raven

Figure 90: Raven’s feasible tour to visit the
reachable hotspots

Figure 91: Raven’s feasible tour paths (orange),
links (cyan), and other traversable edges (black)

Figure 92: Raven’s OA and the terrain elevation (ASL) based on 127 datapoints (in meters)


Visited hotspots:



Unreachable hotspots: 119



Tours generated:

1 (no subtours)



Tour length:

14,291.17m



Travel time:

793.95s

= 13.23min



Inspection time:

1205.79s

= 20.09min



Flight time:

1999.75s

= 33.33min



Downtime:

300s

= 5min



Cycle time:

2299.75

= 38.33min

76
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2.3.2. Shadow

Figure 93: Shadow’s feasible tour to visit the
reachable hotspots

Figure 94: Shadow’s feasible tour paths (orange),
links (cyan), and other traversable edges (black)

Figure 95: Shadow’s OA and the terrain elevation (ASL) based on 274 datapoints (in meters)


Visited hotspots:



Unreachable hotspots: 24



Tours generated:

1 (no subtours)



Tour length:

30,523.76m



Travel time:

763.09s

= 12.72min



Inspection time:

769.62s

= 12.83min



Flight time:

1532.72s

= 25.55min



Downtime:

3600s

= 60min



Cycle time:

5132.72

= 85.55min

171
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2.3.3. ScanEagle

Figure 96: ScanEagle’s feasible tour to visit the
reachable hotspots

Figure 97: ScanEagle’s feasible tour paths (orange),
links (cyan), and other traversable edges (black)

Figure 98: ScanEagle’s OA and the terrain elevation (ASL) based on 315 datapoints (in meters)


Visited hotspots:



Unreachable hotspots: 2



Tours generated:

1 (no subtours)



Tour length:

34830.87m



Travel time:

1393.23s

= 23.22min



Inspection time:

1407.5s

= 23.46min



Flight time:

2800.73s

= 46.68min



Downtime:

900s

= 15min



Cycle time:

3700.73

= 61.68min

193
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2.3.4. Remarks
In this case study, the tour segmentation process returns no subtours. All three UAVs are
assigned one complete tour each. From the perspective of the forthcoming resource allocation process,
this means two things. First, it signifies that the coefficients matrix of TBSCP has three columns only,
which renders solving the problem easy. Second, it implies that there is no need to solve TBVAP as there
are no independent subtours to be operated concurrently.

2.4. Resource Allocation
2.4.1. Tactical Systems
To execute the resource allocation procedure for tactical assets, revisit‐times are needed for
each high‐risk cell. In this study, these numbers are attained by a simple systematic conversion of RTM
risk‐scores that is based on segregating the set of hotspots into two sets: (1) the first‐degree high‐risk
cells whose risk‐score exceeds 0.6 (depicted in Figure 81), and (2) the second‐degree high‐risk cells,
which constitute the remaining of the hotspots (i.e. their risk‐scores are within the range [0.6, 0.5]). The
former group is assigned a revisit‐time of 17 minutes (1012s) whereas the latter is given a value of 27
minutes (1620s). The target function τj can be written in terms of the risk‐score sj (for a certain hotspot j)
as follows:

τj =

1012s
1620s
0s

if 0.6 < sj
if 0.5 < sj < 0.6
otherwise

Note: the rationale behind the 17‐minute revisit‐time is that it is the sum of half the time needed to
cross one kilometer of rough terrain (i.e. 15 minutes, as derived from the assumption established in the
beginning of Section 2) and a two‐minute leeway. On the other hand, the 27‐minute revisit‐time reflects
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the difference in importance between first‐degree and second degree high‐risk cells through a 10‐
minute gap.
After obtaining the flight cycle‐times from the tour generation process, and computing the
revisit‐times using the above function, the TBSCP model is populated and solved. The solution proposes
the utilization of four ScanEagles to service the same 193‐node tour in a concurrent but asynchronous
fashion, with a 15‐minute revisit‐time for all reachable hotspots. This solution assumes that each vehicle
has to go through a 15‐minute downtime after finishing a tour. If such a restriction is omitted, the
framework gives an alternative that entails employing three ScanEagles only, with a 16.33‐minute
revisit‐time for all reachable hotspots. Note that the removal of such assumption in this particular case
is not only safe, but it actually yields a more efficient way to perform surveillance, and that is mainly due
to the ScanEagle’s 24‐hour long endurance. In other words, this UAV can be operated continuously until
it needs refueling and servicing, which would happen once a day rather than after every tour.
Another important and appealing feature of the three‐ScanEagle solution is that the surveillance
schedule is insignificantly affected when one of the three UAVs becomes unavailable. Such an
inconvenience can occur for many reasons. It may happen that the UAV has to urgently carry out an
identification mission that is triggered by a cross‐cueing operation. In addition, the vehicle will
eventually require refueling, preventive maintenance, and even unpredicted repair from time to time. It
is important to note though that there has to be a change in operation in order to preserve the
effectiveness of the surveillance plan during the period of unavailability; this is achieved by switching
from the original configuration—which is based on visiting all 193 reachable hotspots every 16.33
minutes using all three UAVs concurrently—to the contingency configuration. This contingency
alternative entails dedicating one UAV to the first‐degree high‐risk cells only and allocating the other
UAV to the remaining hotspots. As a result, the former set of high‐risk cells is visited about every 15
minutes, while the latter set is revisited approximately every 30 minutes.
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To assess this solution from another perspective, some of the performance measures that can
be derived from the provided input data are as follows:


Manning requirement: 3 at any given moment (one operator per UAV)



Average slope coverage for scanned hotspots: 100%



Average slope coverage for all visited cells: 100%
Looking back at the input data, the ScanEagle UAV seems to have had high chances of being

selected by a certain analysis or analytical tool as the mobile surveillance asset of choice for COP Kahler
(and potentially for other COPs/OPs). When compared to its tactical counterparts, it is clear that it
enjoys the longest endurance by far, the widest range of communication, the greatest maximum
operating altitude, and the highest resistance to crosswinds. These capabilities allow the vehicle to
confront the set of limitations caused by weather and terrain in a much competent fashion.
Furthermore, this UAV is one of the two most silent machines and can fly as low as 60 meters, making it
ideal for stealth and target identification. Another advantage is the unnecessity of a runaway as the
vehicle can be catapulted in the air. The fact that the developed framework picked this asset serves as a
good validator of its constraint analysis and optimization structure.
2.4.2. Stationary Systems
Let it be assumed that the analyst is targeting a virtual wall around the center of the outpost
with the following properties:


an outer square that has a side length of 200m



a thickness of 50 meters with surveillance coverage at the dismount‐identification level (i.e. the
sensor’s FOV is a disk with a radius rID = 40m as mentioned in Chapter 6 Section 2.3.1)



a 20% allowance for lack of coverage
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The framework gives two solution alternatives, the first of which is based purely on tower‐
cameras and is referred to as A1. A1 requires the deployment of eight sensors as demonstrated in
Figure 99. Such a solution is low‐cost and provides full coverage at the dismount‐detection level within
a 320m‐radius.

Figure 99: The layout of sensor FOVs (in blue) on the 50‐meter‐thick virtual wall (in green)
Source of original picture (without the blue and green overlays): SUSACS (2010)
The second alternative, referred to as A2, is an expensive but powerful solution that involves the
deployment of one aerostat that is tethered at the center of the outpost. This setup yields coverage radii
rID = 250m, rDD = 1000m, rDV = 4000m for the dismount‐identification, dismount‐detection, and vehicle‐
detection levels, respectively.

3. Conclusion
Running the given 5x5km2 data set for the Wanat region—the past location of COP Kahler—
through the developed analytical framework recommends using a combination of tactical vehicles and
stationary sensors.
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The tactical solution proposes the use of three ScanEagles in a couple of settings:


The original configuration, a surveillance schedule that requires all three assets to fly
concurrently at an adequate distance from each other, such that each of the reachable
identified high‐risk cells is visited every 16.33 minutes.



The contingency configuration, which is only used when one of the three assets is unavailable,
has a schedule that necessitates that one ScanEagle is dedicated to the subset of high‐risk cells
whose score exceeds 0.6, while the other ScanEagle monitors the rest of the hotspots. This
results in revisit‐times of about 15 and 30 minutes for the former and latter subsets,
respectively.
The framework also gives two alternatives for the layout of stationary assets. The first

alternative involves the utilization of eight tower‐cameras placed around the center of the outpost in a
squared manner at approximately 80 meters from each other. This low‐cost surrogate has reliable
coverage of the COP’s nearby whereabouts, but has the disadvantage of being ineffective against sniper
threats. The second alternative on the other hand is based solely on using an aerostat, a solution that
provides much wider coverage at both the detection and identification levels, but might not be justified
due to its high cost.
This recommended surveillance plan is constructed in a way to help detect the presence of
threats within a two‐kilometer radius from COP Kahler at least one hour before the insurgents’ attack
begins. According to our understanding of the historical facts extracted from the SUSACS (2010) study,
the surveillance solution would have prevented the killing and wounding of the U.S. and Afghan soldiers
as the reliable enforcement from the neighboring FOB would have arrived before the conflict started.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that this analytical tool is designed to provide a flexible means to
analyze complex terrain and provide an adequate solution that meets the different constraints stemmed
from the surrounding environment. In general, adding a new data set to the framework (e.g. a newly
considered platform, a more recent trafficability matrix, etc) can technically disrupt a currently‐obtained
solution, a fact that requires performing the analysis with the newly adopted considerations. With this
tool however, reconsidering new assets or new environment parameters is as easy as spending few
minutes reexecuting the four phases and exploring its output.

4. Dissertation Summary
In the past, the U.S. Army has experienced well‐orchestrated attacks that have led to casualties
and heavy damage in small combat outposts located in foreign lands where the geo‐surface is rough and
mountainous. In an effort to reduce or even eliminate this vulnerability, this study assesses the factors
that promote risk in such circumstances and addresses an investment problem whose solution specifies
the surveillance requirements that can mitigate such risk. To be more specific, this research explores the
capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles and stare‐systems to offer a programmatic way that provides a
customized, effective, and practical answer to the following question: given a complex terrain and a
smart adversary, what types of surveillance systems, and how many entities of each kind, does a military
outpost need to adequately monitor its surrounding environment?
The addressed problem is difficult to resolve because a mixed portfolio of assets, along with
their efficient methods of operation, have to be selected from a myriad of options while considering
environmental, technological, and threat aspects. It is certainly extremely challenging, if not impossible,
to model and solve as one entity. Although a review of the literature shows that surveillance planning
and counter‐insurgency have received some attention, no research work is found to be directly
applicable to this very problem. Most methods and frameworks that evaluate the geo‐surface are
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specific to their subject matter, and have as a result limited applicability. In addition, there is a lack of
integrated optimization models that take the terrain analysis as an input and produce flight plans and
resource allocation solutions as an output. Consequently, the approach followed in this effort is based
on constructing a four‐phased framework that incorporates planetary surface assessment, constraint
analysis, optimization, and space visualization. This analytical tool is effective, novel, and unique with
regards to its holistic methodology of answering the research question at hand in a realistic and practical
fashion, a procedure that requires good understanding of intelligent insurgency and constrained
situational awareness. The developed framework overcomes the entailed challenge by integrating a set
of powerful analytical concepts and modeling techniques to address a distinct compilation of real‐world
restraints during the construction of a customized robust surveillance plan—and hence, a portfolio of
systems—for a given COP/OP.
In the first phase, a variant of the Risk Terrain Modeling paradigm is employed to assess the geo‐
surface for potential insurgent presence and extract a spatially distributed output that aids at
determining, visualizing, and converting risk to a group of hotspots along with their practical revisit‐
times. Besides its inherent nature of evaluating risk, RTM is specifically selected amongst other well‐
established methods as the tool of choice because it exploits the same space representation
infrastructure assumed in this analysis—the two‐dimensional grid, which is decided upon due to its
simplicity and computational efficiency. Nonetheless, two adjustments to RTM are necessary in order to
render it suitable for the context of this study: (1) an extra step is added so as to convert raw weather
and terrain attributes to meaningful risk‐factors; and (2) risk‐scores are allowed to hold any value in the
range [0,1] (as opposed to 0 and 1 only) in order to avoid the underestimation of accumulated risk from
such factors. The output of this method is the composite map—a matrix whose entries coincide with the
2D grid of the terrain map—in which high‐risk grid cells are identified and their corresponding revisit‐
time is computed.
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In the second phase, hotspot‐comprising tours and subtours are generated for each considered
UAV in an exceptionally feasible manner—using Mathematical Programing with heuristic approaches—
in order to adhere to several technological limitations and realistic geological restraints. That is achieved
by first ensuring through a process of constraint satisfaction and cell elimination that the digitized
terrain infrastructure contains reachable cells only. Next, an efficient sequence of visits to the hotspots
identified in the previous phase is acquired by solving the Traveling Salesman Problem. Also, for each
consecutive elements of this sequence of cells, the Shortest Path Problem is solved to find the best
feasible cell‐to‐cell route. The MP models associated with these two optimization problems are adopted
without adjustment because the reduced network on which they are operating is already constraint‐
compliant. Conversely, the set of heights at which each UAV is to travel when traversing such paths are
specified using a custom‐made highly constrained linear program—which is referred to as the Operating
Altitude Problem model—due to its context specificity and uniqueness. After obtaining the 3D tours
using these aforementioned steps, each tour is checked against its associated UAV’s endurance; tours
that violate this constraint are segmented into feasible subtours. The set of restraints modeled in this
phase pertain to wireless communication range, terrain elevation, wind level, as well as the aerial
vehicle’s min/max operating altitude, climb‐/dive‐rates, noise (dB‐)distance, captured image resolution,
and endurance.
In the third phase, constrained resource allocation is performed on tactical vehicles via Mixed
Integer Programming to select the best combination of trajectories and their servicing UAVs, whereas
sensor‐ground geometry is exploited to construct a lean arrangement of stationary surveillance systems.
To be more specific, a variant of the Set Covering Problem is employed to find the best combination of
tour and subtours to visit all reachable hotspots in a manner that meets the revisit‐times specified in the
first phase. To achieve the temporal aspect, the original SCP formulation—which already offers a simple
and efficient way to generally pick a subset of options that satisfies the coverage demand—is expanded
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to account for the necessary revisit‐frequency through one closed‐form constraint. Yet, the obtained
SCP solution may sometimes be improvable by reducing the number of UAVs needed to perform the
selected subtours. This is effectually accomplished via a time‐based modification of the classical
Assignment Problem whereby two closed‐form constraints are added to the involved model in order to
keep the revisit‐time restraint from being violated. In these optimization cases, Mixed Integer
Programming proves very useful in enforcing the refueling, scheduling, and revisit‐frequency restraints,
which renders the obtained solution easily scalable through repetition to obtain the 24‐hour flight
schedule. On the other hand, a layout of stare‐systems is generated in order to compensate for the
intermittency of the UAVs’ service. The placement of stationary systems is performed by an ad hoc
geometry‐based algorithm that minimizes unnecessary overlap in an effort to reduce the cost of the
proposed solution. This computational procedure enforces the asset protection and other geometric
constraints by relying on a special infrastructure called the virtual wall, which specifies the area around
the outpost that is to be covered by FOV projections. Such an algorithm is very fast since it estimates the
position coordinates of each sensor using mathematical formulas as opposed to seeking a vector of
variable values using a solver or heuristic. After the tactical and stationary aspects of the resource
allocation are addressed, the construction process is terminated and the acquired surveillance plan
finally reveals the portfolio of assets to be purchased.
The fourth phase does not solve an analytical problem per se; rather, it provides multiple time‐
and geometry‐based measures of effectiveness. The statistics considered in this study pertain to the
required manning, surface coverage, slope coverage, captured image quality, tour lengths, travel times,
inspection times, flight times, and others. The surveillance plan evaluation also reveals, if any, the set of
unreachable hotspots as well as the set of cells where the revisit‐time is much higher than required. This
not only helps appraise the proposed surveillance plan and identify any vulnerabilities, but it also assists
the analyst with any necessary massaging of the final solution for the purpose of adding the human

145

touch to it and considering any exogenous issues such as contingency responses to asset loss or
unavailability.
This ordered comprehensiveness that is associated with risk‐based planetary surface evaluation,
constrained flight planning, restrained resource allocation, and surveillance plan assessment, is what
highlights the contribution of this study, and is what helps the surveillance architect answer the research
question without reaching out to other complementary methods.
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APPENDIX

1. AMPL Model for TSP
param N integer > 2;
# Number of nodes
set NODES ordered := {0..N-1};
# set of node indices
set ARCS := {i in NODES, j in NODES: i <> j}; # set of arcs
param c{ARCS};
# cost of travelling from node i to node j
var x{ARCS} binary;
var y{NODES} >= 0;

# 1 if trip from node i to node j is chosen, 0 otherwise
# the number of so-far visited nodes when at node i

minimize objective:
sum {(i,j) in ARCS} c[i,j] * x[i,j];
subject to enter_each_node_once {i in NODES}:
sum{(i,j) in ARCS} x[i,j] = 1;
subject to leave_each_node_once {i in NODES}:
sum{(j,i) in ARCS} x[j,i] = 1;
subject to no_subtour1 {(i,j) in ARCS: i<>j and i >= 1 and j >= 1}:
y[i] - y[j] + N * x[i,j] <= N - 1;
subject to no_subtour2 {i in NODES: i >= 1}:
y[i] + (N - 2) * x[0,i] <= N - 1;
subject to no_subtour3 {i in NODES: i >= 1}:
y[i] - (N - 2) * x[i,0] >= 1;

2. Pseudo‐Code for TSP Heuristic
sizeThreshold = 25;
function solveDynamically(nodeList, grid)
{
if(nodeList.size() <= sizeThreshold)
solution = solveExactly(nodeList); //using a solver (e.g. CPLEX)
else
{
if(grid.columns() > grid.rows())
{
(sublis1, sublist2) = divideVertically(nodeList);
(subgrid1, subgrid2) = divideVertically(grid);
}
else
{
(sublis1, sublist2) = divideHorizontally(nodeList);
(subgrid1, subgrid2) = divideHorizontally(grid);
}
dummyNode1 = getCentroid(sublist2);
dummyNode2 = getCentroid(sublist1);
sublist1.add(dummyNode1);
sublist2.add(dummyNode2);
solution1 = solveDynamically(sublist1, subgrid1);
solution2 = solveDynamically(sublist2, subgrid2);
solution = join(solution1, solution2); //dummy nodes are removed here
}
return solution;
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}

3. AMPL Model for SPP
set NODES;
set EDGES;
param c{EDGE};
param b{NODES};

#
#
#
#
#
#
param a{NODES,EDGES}; #
#
#
var x{EDGE} binary;

set of nodes
set of edges
cost of travelling through an edge
b[j] = 1 if node j is the origin
b[j] = -1 if node j is the destination
b[j] = 0 otherwise
a[j,i] = 1 if node j is the start of edge i
a[j,i] = -1 if node j is the end of edge i
a[j,i] = 0 otherwise

# x[i] = 1 if edge i is selected to be in the path, 0 otherwise

Minimise objective:
sum{i in EDGES} c[i] * x[i] ;
Subject to enter_each_node_once {j in NODES}:
Sum{i in EDGES} a[j,i] * x[i] = b[j];

4. AMPL Model for OAP
set NODES;
# set of nodes visited by UAV through the surveillance tour
set EDGES within (NODES cross NODES);
param
param
param
param
param
param
param
param
param
param
var
var
var
var
var

elev{NODES} >= 0;
dist{EDGES} >= 0;
climb_rate >= 0;
dive_rate >= 0;
lb_oa_agl >= 0;
ub_oa_asl >= 0;
db_dist_agl >= 0;
w1 >= 0;
w2 >= 0;
w3 >= 0;

#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

cell/node's elevation
edge's length (distance traveled)
UAV's maximum climb-rate
UAV's maximum dive-rate
UAV's operating altitude lower bound (above ground level)
UAV's operating altitude upper bound (above sea level)
UAV's DB (noise) distance (above ground level)
objective 1's weight
objective 2's weight
objective 3's weight

oa_agl{NODES} >= 0;
oa_asl{NODES} >=0;
a{NODES} >= 0;
max_oa_change >= 0;
max_oa_agl >= 0;

#
#
#
#
#

UAV's operating altitude (above ground level)
UAV's operating altitude (above sea level)
allowance for violating stealth constraint at a node
maximum operating altitude change across all edges
maximum operating altitude across all nodes (AGL)

minimize objective:
w1 * max_oa_change + w2 * max_oa_agl + w3 * sum{i in NODES} a[i];
subject to
oa_asl_constraint {i in NODES}:
oa_asl[i] = oa_agl[i] + elev[i];
lb_oa_agl_constraint {i in NODES}:
oa_agl[i] >= lb_oa_agl;
ub_oa_agl_constraint {i in NODES}:
oa_asl[i] <= ub_oa_asl;
climb_dive_constraint1 {(i,j) in EDGES}:
oa_asl[i] - oa_asl[j] <= min(climb_rate, dive_rate) * dist[i,j];
climb_dive_constraint2 {(i,j) in EDGES}:
-oa_asl[i] + oa_asl[j] <= min(climb_rate, dive_rate) * dist[i,j];
# for objective1 formulation
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max_oa_change_constraint1 {(i,j) in EDGES}:
oa_asl[i] - oa_asl[j] <= max_oa_change;
max_oa_change_constraint2 {(i,j) in EDGES}:
-oa_asl[i] + oa_asl[j] <= max_oa_change;
# for objective2 formulation
stealth_constraint {i in NODES}:
oa_agl[i] + a[i] >= db_dist_agl;
# for objective3 formulation
min_oa_agl_constraint {i in NODES}:
oa_agl[i] <= max_oa_agl;

Example of Input Data:
data;
set NODES := 0 1 2 3;
set EDGES := (0,1) (0,2) (0,3);
param
param
param
param
param

dive_rate := 1;
climb_rate := 1;
db_dist_agl := 100;
lb_oa_agl := 50;
ub_oa_asl := 1500;

param:
0
1
2
3

elev :=
450
500
400
400;

0 1
0 2
0 3

dist :=
50
50
100;

param:

5. Pseudo‐Code for the Tour Segmentation Algorithm
function segmentTour()
{
foreach startNode in sortedHotspotsByTSPSequence
{
//initiating a subtour
subtour.add(linkTo(startNode)); //going from outpost to startNode
subtour.add(linkTo(startNode)); //going from startNode to outpost
traveledDistance = totalLength(subtour);
nextNode = startNode;
while(true)
{
currentNode = nextNode;
nextNode = getNextNode(sortedHotspotsByTSPSequence, currentNode);
//computing endurance cost of subtour expansion
distanceChange = -linkTo(currentNode).length()
+ path(currentNode, nextNode).Length()
+ linkTo(nextNode).getLength();
//expanding subtour if feasible
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//- old return link
//+ new path
//+ new return link

if(enduranceConstraint.isVerified(traveledDistance + distanceChange))
{
subtour.remove(linkTo(currentNode));
subtour.add(path(currentNode, nextNode));
subtour.add(linkTo(nextNode));
traveledDistance = traveledDistance + distanceChange;
}
else break;
}
subtourDatabase.save(startNode, subtour);
}
if(subtourDatabase.containsCompleteTour())
return leastCostTour(subtourDatabase);
else return allSavedSubtours(subtourDatabase);
}

6. AMPL Model for TBSCP
param N integer;
param M integer;
set NODES := {0..N-1};
set SUBTOURS := {0..M-1};
param c{SUBTOURS};
param f{NODES,SUBTOURS};
param t{NODES};

#
#
#
#
#
#
#

number of nodes
number of subtours
set of node indices
set of subtour indices
cost of selecting a subtour (in distance)
visit frequency if tour contains node; 0 otherwise
required revisit-time of a node

var x{SUBTOURS} integer >= 0;

# needed number of trips for a certain subtour

minimize objective:
sum{j in SUBTOURS} c[j] * x[j];
subject to revisit_time_constraint {i in NODES}:
sum{j in SUBTOURS} f[i,j] * x[j] >= 1/t[i];

7. AMPL Model for TBVAP
param M integer;
param N integer;
set VEHICLES := {0..N-1};
set SUBTOURS := {0..N-1};
param d{VEHICLES,SUBTOURS};
param t{SUBTOURS};

#
#
#
#
#
#

big-M (a very large number)
number of vehicles/subtours
set of vehicle indices
set of subtour indices
duration that vehicle takes to traverse subtour
subtour’s minimum revisit-time (depends on nodes)

var x{VEHICLES,SUBTOURS} binary; # x[i,j]=1 if vehicle i serves subtour j, otherwise 0
var y{VEHICLES} binary;
# y[i]=1 if vehicle i is to be purchased, otherwise 0
minimize objective:
sum{i in VEHICLES} y[i];
subject to cover_all_subtours {j in SUBTOURS}:
sum{i in VEHICLES} x[i,j] = 1;
subject to revisit_time_constraint {i in VEHICLES}:
sum{j in SUBTOURS} d[i,j] * x[i,j] <= min{j in SUBTOURS} t[j];
subject to x_y_relation {i in VEHICLES}:
sum{j in SUBTOURS} x[i,j] <= M * y[i];
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Example of Input Data:
data;
param M :=
param N :=

1000;
5;

param d := [*,*] :
0
0
1.25
1
1.25
2
M
3
1.25
4
M
param t :=

0
1
2
3
4

1
M
1.75
M
M
M

2
1
1
1
1
1

3
1.1
1.1
M
1.1
M

4 :=
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.75;

2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5;

8. Pseudo‐Code for the SSPP Algorithm
function placeSensors(virtualWall)
{
layersList = divideIntoLayers(virtualWall); // this may return one layer only
foreach(segment in virtualWall.segmentsList)
segment.computeAllowance();
foreach(layer in layersList)
foreach(segment in layer.segmentsList)
segment.computeAllowance();
foreach(layer in layersList)
{
foreach(corner in layer.cornersList)
corner.place(new Sensor());
foreach(segment in layer.segmentsList)
{
CC = segment.computeCoverageContribution();
if(CC < segment.area * (1 - segment.allowance))
{
N = ceiling((A * (1 - a) - CC) / (H * (W - 2 * s)));
for(i = 1; i <= N; i++)
layout.placeOnCentroidsLine(new Sensor(), i); // at ith position
}
}
}
finalize(layout); // recover the original circular shape of the sensor’s range
}
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